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Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?1 
Dan L. Burk2 and Mark A. Lemley3 
 
[The software patent cases] stand as a testament to the ability of law to 
adapt to new and innovative concepts, while remaining true to basic 
principles.4 
 
 
 Fundamental shifts in technology and in the economic landscape are 
rapidly making the current system of intellectual property rights 
unworkable and ineffective.  Designed more than 100 years ago to meet 
the simpler needs of an industrial era, it is an undifferentiated, one-size-
fits-all system.  Although treating all advances in knowledge in the same 
way may have worked when most patents were granted for new 
mechanical devices, todays brainpower industries pose challenges that are 
far more complex.5 
 
 Patent law has a general set of legal rules to govern the validity and infringement 
of patents in a wide variety of technologies.  With a very few exceptions, the statute does 
not distinguish between different technologies in setting and applying legal standards.  
Rather, those standards are designed to adapt flexibly to new technologies, encompassing 
anything under the sun made by man.6  In theory, then, we have a unified patent system 
that provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of technologies. 
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Of late, however, we have noticed an increasing divergence between the rules 
actually applied to different industries.  The best examples are biotechnology and 
computer software.  In biotechnology cases, the Federal Circuit has bent over backwards 
to find biotechnological inventions nonobvious, even if the prior art demonstrates a clear 
plan for producing the invention.  On the other hand, the court has imposed stringent 
enablement and written description requirements on biotechnology patents that do not 
show up in other disciplines.  In computer software cases, the situation is reversed.  The 
Federal Circuit has essentially excused software inventions from compliance with the 
enablement and best mode requirements, but in a way that raises serious questions about 
how stringently it will read the nonobviousness requirements.  As a practical matter, it 
appears, while patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is technology-specific in 
application.  We provide evidence for this claim in Part I. While our paper focuses on 
biotechnology and computer software, which present two extreme examples of this 
phenomenon, our approach has applications in other industries as well, notably chemical 
inventions and semiconductors. 
 Part II explains how the application of the same legal standards can lead to such 
different results in diverse industries.  Much of the variance in patent standards is 
attributable to the use of a legal construct, the person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA), to determine obviousness and enablement.  The more skill those in the art 
have, the less information a patentee has to disclose, but the harder it is to find an 
invention nonobvious.  One reading of the biotechnology and computer software cases is 
that the Federal Circuit believes computer programmers are extremely skilled, while 
biotechnology experts know very little about their art. We do not challenge the idea that 
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the standards in each industry should vary with the level of skill in that industry.  We 
think the use of the PHOSITA provides needed flexibility for patent law, permitting it to 
adapt to new technologies without losing its essential character.  We fear, however, that 
the Federal Circuit has not applied that standard properly in either the biotechnology or 
computer software fields.  The court has a perception of both fields that was set in older 
cases but which does not reflect the modern realities of the industry.  The changes in an 
industry over time present significant structural problems for patent law, both because 
law is necessarily backward-looking and precedent-bound, and because applying 
different standards to similar inventions raises concerns about horizontal equity.  
Nonetheless, we believe the courts must take more care than they currently do to ensure 
that their assessments of patent validity are rooted in understandings of the technology 
that were accurate at the time the invention was made. 
The question then becomes whether patent law should vary from industry to 
industry.  We turn to that question in Part III.  The level of skill in the art affects not just 
patent validity, but also patent scope.  Because both claim construction and the doctrine 
of equivalents turn on the understanding of the PHOSITA in certain circumstances, 
judgments the court makes about those industries affect the scope of those patents that do 
issue.  In particular, the cases we discuss tend to push the two industries in very different 
directions: towards a large number of valid biotechnology patents of very limited scope, 
and a smaller number of valid software patents of quite substantial scope.  Given the 
economics of the two industries, we think it quite possible that this is exactly backwards 
as a matter of economic policy.   
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This policy conclusion leads us to question whether patent law should explicitly 
attempt to tailor protection to the needs of specific industries, as many have suggested.  
While we draw no definitive conclusions on this score, we do point out a number of risks 
inherent in such a technology-specific approach.  These risks suggest that policy-makers 
should be cautious about trading our uniform patent system for an industry-specific one.  
But it may make sense to take economic policy more explicitly into account in designing 
even general patent rules. 
 
I. Heterogeneity in the Patent Law 
 
A. The History of the Uniform Patent System 
 A patent statute was one of the first laws Congress passed, in 1790.  Since that 
time, a patent statute has been a constant feature of the U.S. legal landscape.7  While the 
nature of the system went through some rather dramatic changes in the first 50 years of 
the Republic  beginning with a requirement that two cabinet officials must personally 
review and sign off on any patent,8 swinging to the other extreme with an automatic 
registration system subject to caveats9 -- by 1836 the essential features of the modern 
                                                           
7   See, e.g., Bruce Bugbee, The Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 126, 143 (1967); 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and 
Administration, 1787-1836, 79 J. Pat. & Trademark Ofc. Socy 61 (1997) and 80 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Ofc. Socy 11 (1998).  Even before that time, the U.S. colonies granted patent rights.  See Robert P. 
Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 127 (2d ed. 2000). 
 
8   This was a feature of the short-lived Patent Act of 1790.  See Walterscheid, supra note __; Edward C. 
Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445 
(1997). 
 
9   The 1793 Act replaced the cumbersome cabinet-level review with a registration system.  Under this 
system, patents were granted without examination unless a competitor or other interested party filed a 
caveat  essentially a request to be notified and given a chance to object if someone patented in a 
particular field.  See Walterscheid, supra note __, at __. 
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patent law were in place.10  Despite periodic revisions, most recently in 1952, the basic 
structure of the patent system has remained unchanged for 165 years. 
 Technology, of course, has changed dramatically during that time.  The useful 
arts envisioned by the Framers were mechanical inventions useful in a primarily 
agrarian economy.  Since that time, the country has gone through a number of periods of 
dramatic innovation in a wide variety of fields.  As late as 1950, though, most inventions 
were still mechanical in nature.  It is only in the last half-century  and to a large extent in 
the last 25 years, as Allison and Lemley show11 -- that patent law has lost its primarily 
mechanical character, branching out into biotechnology, semiconductors, computer 
hardware and software, electronics, and telecommunications.   
 What is notable about this history is that the fundamental rules of patent law were 
set in a world in which inventions were mechanical.  Because inventions in the past were 
far more homogenous than they are today,12 it made sense to have a unified set of rules 
for dealing with those inventions.  The application of those old rules to new technologies 
has not been free from controversy.  Some have suggested that the unified rules suitable 
for the old, homogeneous world are no longer appropriate in todays increasingly 
complex innovative landscape.13  But without changing the rules themselves, in the last 
dozen years the Federal Circuit has applied those rules in a way that effectively creates 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
10   See Merges et al., supra note __, at 128. 
 
11   See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent System, 1976-1998 
(working paper 2001). 
 
12   Id. 
 
13   See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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different standards for different industries.14  In the sections that follow, we examine the 
treatment of two such industries in detail: computer software and biotechnology. 
 
 B. Software Patent Law 
 Software is patentable today, though it was not always so.15  The Federal Circuit 
has moved towards declaring software patentable by fits and starts for years.  Finally, 
with the late-1990s decisions in State Street Bank16 and AT&T v. Excel,17 the court 
unreservedly admitted software to the pantheon of patentable subject matter.  In doing so, 
the court emphasized that it was deciding only the question of whether software could be 
                                                           
14   Hodges observes that computers and biotechnology are treated differently in the written description 
cases, though he limits his focus primarily to biotechnology. Robert A Hodges, Black Box Biotech 
Inventions: When a Mere Wish or Plan Should be Considered an Adequate Description of the Invention, 
17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 831, 832 (2001). Others have complained that even within industries the standard 
may not be applied consistently.  See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 Mich. Telecom. & 
Tech. L. Rev. 363, 365 & n.13 (2001). 
 
15   The curious history of the patentability of software is discussed in detail elsewhere.  See, e.g., Julie E. 
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 
(2001); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:  The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and 
Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.J. 1025, 1033 n.24 (1990); Gregory A. Stobbs, 
Software Patents (1995); David S. Benyacar, Mathematical Algorithm Patentability:  Understanding the 
Confusion, 19 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 129 (1993); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of 
Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 959 (1986); Irah H. Donner & J. Randall Beckers, Throwing Out Baby 
Benson with the Bath Water:  Proposing a New Test for Determining Statutory Subject Matter, 33 
Jurimetrics J. 247 (1993); Lee Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right:  The Need For Congressional Action 
On Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283 (1996); Allen Newell, The Models Are Broken, The Models Are 
Broken!, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1023 (1986); Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Algorithm War: Benson to 
Iwahashi, Its Déjà Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371 (1991); Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive 
Patentable Software:  Are There Still Diehr or Was It Just a Flook?, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 363 (1993); John 
Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 145 (1991); Jonathan N. Geld, Note, General Does Not Mean Generic -- Shedding Light 
on In re Alappat, 4 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 71 (1995); Maximilian R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It, Now 
You Dont:  Was It a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable Algorithm? On Principle and Expediency 
in Current Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Computer-Related Inventions, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 90 
(1995). 
 
16   State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 
17   AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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patented under section 101.18  It left the remaining patent validity issues  notably 
novelty,19 nonobviousness,20 and compliance with the disclosure requirements21  to be 
worked out by the courts on a case-by-case basis.22 
 Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that patentees publish to the world a 
description of their invention sufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make 
and use it, as well as their best mode of implementing the invention.23 Indeed, this 
disclosure bargain between patentees and the public is central to patent policy.24 
Disclosure servers two purposes.  First, it permits competitors to make use of the patented 
invention once the patent expires, ensuring that the invention will ultimately enter the 
public domain.25  Second, it enables others to improve on the patented technology during 
the term of the patent itself, either by designing around the patent to produce a non-
infringing variant or by developing a better version that, while infringing, is itself entitled 
to protection.26 
                                                           
18   35 U.S.C. §101. 
 
19   35 U.S.C. §102. 
 
20   35 U.S.C. §103. 
 
21   35 U.S.C. §112 ¶1. 
 
22   See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.  Indeed, on remand in that case the district court held the patent 
invalid under section 102.  AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (D. Del. 1999). 
 
23 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1 (1994). 
 
24 One classic justification for having a patent system is to encourage inventors to disclose their ideas to the 
public, who will benefit from this new knowledge once the patent expires. Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) (referring to the federal interest in disclosure embodied in the patent 
laws); see also Edith Tilton Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System 31-34 (1951). 
 
25   Without the disclosure obligation, patentees could conceivably keep the workings of their inventions 
secret, relying on that secrecy to extend protection even after the patent has expired.  Cf. Pitney-Bowes v. 
Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1372 n.12 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing the policy concerns here). 
 
26   For a detailed discussion of how the law allocates rights between initial inventors and improvers, see, 
e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? Burk & Lemley  DRAFT 
 8 
 
 For software patents, however, a series of recent Federal Circuit decisions has all 
but eliminated the enablement and best mode requirements. In recent years, the Federal 
Circuit has held that software patentees need not disclose source or object code, 
flowcharts, or detailed descriptions of the patented program. Rather, the court has found 
high-level functional description sufficient to satisfy both the enablement and best mode 
doctrines.27  For example, in Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.,28 the patent 
claimed an improved method of entering, verifying, and storing (or batching") data with a 
special data entry terminal. The district court invalidated certain claims of the patent on 
the grounds that they were inadequately disclosed under section 112.  The Federal Circuit 
reversed.  It held that when claims pertain to a computer program that implements a 
claimed device or method, the enablement requirement varies according to the nature of 
the claimed invention as well as the role and complexity of the computer program needed 
to implement it. Under the facts in this case, the core of the claimed invention was the 
combination of components or steps, rather than the details of the program the applicant 
actually used. The court noted expert testimony that various programs could be used to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1997); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75 (1994); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: 
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 4 J. Econ. Persp. 29 (1991) Jerry R. Green & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. Econ. 20 (1995); Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?, 27 RAND 
J. Econ. 322 (1996); Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 
RAND J. Econ. 34 (1995); James B. Kobak Jr., Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Hidden 
Choices Between Original and Sequential Innovation, 3 Va. J. L. & Tech. 6 (1998); Clarisa Long, 
Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 Emory L.J. 823 (2000).   
 
27 See Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Lawrence D. 
Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer Software:  Reverse 
Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure, 22 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 61, 96-97 (1996); Anthony J. 
Mahajan, Note, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After ProCD:  A Proposed 
Compromise for Computer Software, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3297, 3317 (1999). 
 
28   908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990). 
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implement the invention, and that it would be "relatively straightforward [in light of the 
specification] for a skilled computer programmer to design a program to carry out the 
claimed invention."29 The court continued: 
 The computer language is not a conjuration of some black art, it is simply 
a highly structured language *  *  *  * [T]he conversion of a complete 
thought (as expressed in English and mathematics, i.e. the known input, 
the desired output, the mathematical expressions needed and the methods 
of using those expressions) into a language a machine understands is 
necessarily a mere clerical function to a skilled programmer.30 
And in Fonar v. General Electric,31 involving the best mode requirement, the Court 
explained: 
As a general rule, where software constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out 
an invention, description of such a best mode is satisfied by a disclosure of the 
functions of the software.  This is because, normally, writing code for such 
software is within the skill of the art, not requiring undue experimentation, once 
its functions have been disclosed.  It is well established that what is within the 
skill of the art need not be disclosed to satisfy the best mode requirement as long 
as that mode is described.  Stating the functions of the best mode software 
satisfies that description test.  We have so held previously and we so hold today. 
Thus, flow charts or source code listings are not a requirement for adequately 
disclosing the functions of software.32  
 
 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has gone so far as to hold that patentees can satisfy the 
written description and best mode requirements for inventions implemented in software 
even though they do not use the terms computer or software anywhere in the 
specification!33 To be sure, in these latter cases it would probably be obvious to one 
                                                           
29   Id. at 941-42. 
 
30   Id.  
 
31   107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 
32   Id. at 1549 (citations omitted). 
 
33 Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Engg, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (best mode); In re Dossel, 
115 F.3d 942 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (written description). 
 In White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983), 
by contrast, the Federal Circuit had invalidated a patent for a machine tool control system which was run by 
a computer program. Part of the invention was a programming language translator designed to convert an 
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skilled in the art that the particular feature in question should be implemented in 
software. Still, it is remarkable that the Federal Circuit is willing to find the enablement 
requirement satisfied by a patent specification that provides no guidance whatsoever on 
how the software should be written.34  
 It is simply unrealistic to think that one of ordinary skill in the programming field 
can necessarily reconstruct a computer program given no more than the purpose the 
program is to perform. Programming is a highly technical and difficult art.  But the 
Federal Circuit's peculiar direction in the software enablement cases has effectively 
nullified the disclosure obligation in those cases.35  And since source code is normally 
kept secret, software patentees generally do not disclose much if any detail about their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
input program into machine language, which the system could then execute. The patent specification 
identified an example of a translator program, the so-called "SPLIT" program, which was a trade secret of 
the plaintiff. The court held that the program translator was an integral part of the invention, and that mere 
identification of it was not sufficient to discharge the applicant's duty under section 112. The court seemed 
concerned that maintaining the translator program as a trade secret would allow White to extend the patent 
beyond the 17-year term then specified in the patent code. 
 While White suggests that it is not sufficient merely to identify the program or its functions, more 
recent Federal Circuit authority is overwhelmingly to the contrary. See, e.g., Dossel, supra, at 946 (While 
the written description does not disclose exactly what mathematical algorithm will be used to compute the 
end result, it does state that "known algorithms" can be used to solve standard equations which are known 
in the art.; finding this sufficient to describe the invention). 
 
34   One recent decision even found that a specification that provided inconsistent guidance as to how the 
invention worked was not indefinite.  See S3 Corp. v. Nvidia Corp., __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. Aug. 3, 2001); 
compare id. at __ (__, J., dissenting). 
 
35 A recent development in Federal Circuit jurisprudence may suggest another source for a robust 
disclosure obligation, however. The court has recently reinvigorated the written description requirement in 
section 112 ¶1, not only in biotechnology cases, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), but also in cases about mechanical inventions. E.g., Gentry Gallery, 
Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
Under those cases, a patent claim may be invalid in certain circumstances if the specification does not 
expressly describe what the claim covers, even if the specification gave sufficient information to enable the 
claim. See also Johnson & Johnson Assoc. v. R.E. Service Co., 238 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (taking en 
banc sua sponte a case presenting the issue of dedication to the public domain); Maxwell v. J. Baker, 86 
F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  We argue below that a broad reading of the written description requirement is 
largely unique to biotechnology cases.  If we are wrong, however, and cases like Lilly represent a general 
rule, it could mean that most software patents will be held invalid for failure to describe the invention in 
any detail.  But see In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting written description argument 
in a software case, albeit before the Federal Circuits more recent cases on the issue). 
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programs in the patent. Software patentees during the 1980s and early 1990s tended to 
write their patents in means-plus-function format36 in order to satisfy the changing 
dictates of the Federal Circuit's patentable subject matter rules.37 Lawyers writing patents 
in such a format have an incentive to describe their invention in the specification in as 
general terms as possible, since means-plus-function claim elements will be limited to the 
actual structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.38 As a result, there 
is no easy way to figure out what a software patent owner has built except to reverse 
engineer the program.39   
                                                           
36   See 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6. 
 
37   For an example, see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 
38   Id. 
 
39   On the perils of reverse engineering patented software, see Cohen & Lemley, supra note __, at 17-21. 
 For discussions of how to satisfy the disclosure requirement in software patents, see Wesley L. 
Austin, Software Patents, 7 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 225, 277 (1999); David Bender & Anthony R. 
Barkume, Disclosure Requirements for Software-related Patents, 8 Computer Law. 1 (1991); Michael 
Bondi, Upholding the Disclosure Requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 Through The Submission of Flow 
Charts with Computer Software Patent Applications, 5 Software L.J. 635 (1992); D.C. Toedt III, Patents 
for Inventions Utilizing Computer Software: Some Practical Pointers, 9 Computer Law. 12 (1992) 
(suggesting disclosure of "pseudocode," i.e., generalized code not written in a particular programming 
language, to satisfy section 112; and discussing pros and cons of disclosing actual source code). For a 
policy argument in favor of greater disclosure, see Thomas P. Burke, Note, Software Patent Protection: 
Debugging the Current System, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1115, 1158-1160 (1994): 
 A software patent without source code is like a law review piece filled with case names 
but missing citations to case reporters.  A person of ordinary skill in legal research might 
be able to track down the full-text of all the opinions. Marbury v. Madison would be 
found quicker than a state trial court opinion.  But, would anyone think that such a 
practice was enabling or the best mode?  As it is now, the disclosure requirements can be 
met using such devices as specifications, flowcharts, and pseudo-code. Professor Randall 
Davis of MIT summed it up at the National Research Counsel in 1990: 
   There is almost no way to visualize software.  Sure, we have 
flow charts, we have data-flow diagrams, we have control flow 
diagrams, and everybody knows how basically useless those are.  Flow 
charts are documentation you write afterward -- because management 
requires them, not because they are a useful tool. 
 A patent is most similar to a real property deed specifying the metes and bounds for a 
parcel of land.  Both documents are not easily understood but succeed if they secure the 
owners' interests in the specified claims.  If the goal is to inform the world of an 
invention, software professionals have avenues more timely and less expensive than 
pursuing a patent application.  In fostering the trade-off between the interests of inventors 
and the public, the source code is the best way to explain an algorithm. 
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 The courts reasoning in the enablement and best mode cases has another 
implication as well.  Because the court views actually writing and debugging a program 
as a mere clerical function within the skill of the art, it follows that the court is 
unlikely to consider the work of programming itself to be sufficiently innovative to meet 
the nonobviousness threshold of section 103.  After all, the same tests for adequacy of 
disclosure  would one of ordinary skill in the art be able to make the patented invention 
without undue experimentation  are also central to the obviousness inquiry.40 
 While only a limited number of appellate decisions discuss obviousness in the 
context of software patents, there is some reason to believe the court is imposing a rather 
strict standard. The first case involving the obviousness of a software-implemented 
invention is, perhaps surprisingly, a Supreme Court case from the 1970s.  In Dann v. 
Johnston,41 the Court held a patent on a "machine system for automatic record-keeping of 
bank checks and deposits" invalid for obviousness.  The Court took a rather broad view 
of obviousness in the computer industry, focusing on whether analogous systems to the 
patentee's had been implemented in computer before, rather than analyzing the precise 
differences between the patentee's program and the prior art programs.  The clear 
implication of the opinion is that if a reasonably skilled programmer could produce a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Under this proposal, a computer system's complete source code would not have 
to be appendixed to the patent.  The applicant would only have to include the source code 
directly relevant to enabling the claim language.  In cases where claims are broadly 
written (as in a means-plus-function apparatus claim that covers the automation of an 
entire industry), a nearly complete program listing would be required. 
 
40   Compare In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (levels of experimentation and skill in the art in 
obviousness test) with In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (levels of experimentation and skill in 
the art in enablement test).  See also Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness:  An 
Eternal Golden Braid, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 57 (1987) (discussing the fundamentally interrelated nature of the 
obviousness and enablement inquiries). 
 
41   425 U.S. 219 (1976). 
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program analogous to the patented one, and if there was motivation in the prior art to do 
so, the patented program is obvious.   
 The Federal Circuit has found software patents invalid for obviousness in two 
recent cases, Lockwood v. American Airlines42 and Amazon.com v. Barnes & Noble.43  
Neither case opined directly on the ease with which computer programs could be 
produced, but both read obviousness as a rather substantial hurdle to patentability of 
software.44  In Lockwood, the question was whether the defendants own system made the 
patented claims obvious.  The system had been in public use, but American Airlines had 
kept the workings of the system secret.  Nonetheless, because Lockwoods patent was 
claimed in broad functional terms, the court found that similarly broad functional 
disclosures in the prior art were sufficient to render the patent obvious.  While Lockwood 
argued that the information provided wasnt sufficient for one skilled in the art to make 
and use the system, the court pointed out that it was as detailed as the information 
Lockwoods own patent provided.45  Thus, the patents meager disclosure of technical 
details indirectly contributed to the courts finding of obviousness.  In Amazon.com, the 
court found Amazons one-click shopping feature to be obvious in view of certain 
references describing the desirability or feasibility of such a system in general terms, and 
one prior system that delivered data in response to a mouse click.  The court rejected 
                                                           
42   107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 
43   239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 
44   In In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the Federal Circuit held that a patented software 
invention was nonobvious even though each of the elements of the invention could be found in the prior art, 
where the prior art did not identify the problem to be solved. While Zurko certainly demonstrates that some 
software patents will be held nonobvious, it is a specific holding of rather limited utility to most software 
patentees. 
 
45   107 F.3d at 1570. 
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arguments that the one-click feature was technically difficult to implement, relying on the 
fact that the prior art generally described such a system as both desirable and feasible.  
The court also gave surprisingly short shrift to Amazons evidence of secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness.46 
 The likely result of the Federal Circuits focus on high-level functionality is that 
improvements in programming techniques will be found non-obvious in view of prior art 
that solved the same basic problem in a somewhat different way.  This was arguably the 
result in both Dann and Lockwood, and it seems to follow from the courts view in the 
section 112 cases that programmers are an extremely skilled bunch.  While disclosure is a 
minimal hurdle for software patents, then, obviousness can be a rather tougher one.47 
                                                           
46   Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  To be sure, the court may 
have treated Amazons patent more harshly because the case arose on appeal from a preliminary injunction.  
The court suggested that preliminary injunctions should not be granted if there were any serious question as 
to the validity of the patent.  Id. at 1350-51.  Whether it would apply as strict a test of obviousness after 
trial is not clear. 
 
47   This assumes that courts have access to the prior art necessary to make a realistic obviousness 
determination.  A number of commentators have expressed concern about the difficulty Examiners have in 
finding software prior art. As Julie Cohen explains: 
[I]n the field of computers and computer programs, much that qualifies as prior art lies 
outside the areas in which the PTO has traditionally looked -- previously issued patents 
and previous scholarly publications.  Many new developments in computer programming 
are not documented in scholarly publications at all.  Some are simply incorporated into 
products and placed on the market; others are discussed only in textbooks or user 
manuals that are not available to examiners on line.  In an area that relies so heavily on 
published, "official" prior art, a rejection based on "common industry knowledge" that 
does not appear in the scholarly literature is unlikely.  Particularly where the examiner 
lacks a computer science background, highly relevant prior art may simply be missed.  In 
the case of the multimedia data retrieval patent granted to Compton's New Media,47 
industry criticism prompted the PTO to reexamine the patent and ultimately to reject it 
because it did not represent a novel and nonobvious advance over existing technology.  
However, it would be inefficient, and probably impracticable, to reexamine every 
computer program-related patent, and the PTO is unlikely to do so. 
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:  Intellectual Property 
Implications of "Lock-Out" Technologies, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1179 (1995).  See also Cohen & 
Lemley, supra note __, at 42-44; Greg Aharonian, http://www.bustpatents.com.  Cf. John R. Allison & 
Mark A. Lemley, Whos Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand. L. 
Rev. 2099, 2131-32 (2000) (software patents actually cite slightly more non-patent prior art than other 
types of patents do). 
 Most of this criticism has been directed at the failure of the PTO to find (and patent applicants to 
cite) the relevant prior art.  But parties in litigation have more time and money to spend, and are much more 
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 Patent scope is necessarily interrelated with obviousness and enablement.48  The 
breadth of patent protection is in part a function of how different the invention is from the 
prior art.  Further, patent claims are invalid if they are not fully described and enabled by 
the patent specification, so the permissible breadth of a patent will be determined by how 
much information the court determines must be disclosed to enable one of ordinary skill 
in the art to make and use the patented invention.  The scope of the doctrine of 
equivalents is also a function of obviousness and enablement, since a patentee is not 
permitted to capture ground under the doctrine of equivalents that it would not have been 
permitted to claim in the first place.49   
The Federal Circuits treatment of software validity issues suggests that while the 
court will find relatively few software patents nonobvious, those that it does approve will 
be entitled to broad protection.  The evidence on software patent claim scope so far is 
mixed, though there is some evidence tending to support this hypothesis.  Most notably, 
in Interactive Gift Express v. Compuserve,50 the patentee had designed a kiosk system for 
printing copyrighted works on demand.  The Federal Circuit held that the claims of the 
patent should be read broadly, to cover any form of online downloading in response to a 
remote request.51  In doing so, it reversed the district courts construction of five separate 
claim elements.  As construed by the Federal Circuit, the patent is breathtaking in its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
likely to find the best prior art than the PTO.  The likely result is that while numerous software patents will 
issue, a large number of those actually litigated will be found obvious. 
 
48   See Chisum, supra note __. 
 
49   See Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 
50   __ F.3d __, 2001 WL 792669 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2001). 
 
51   Id. 
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scope, and most electronic commerce sites that permit downloading of digital information 
are likely within its ambit. 
The courts treatment of software patent scope under the doctrine of equivalents 
has been more mixed. Many of these decisions have rejected application of the doctrine 
of equivalents to read claim language written for one product generation at such a high 
level of abstraction that it covers accused products from a different generation. Thus, in 
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co.,52 the Federal Circuit held that a patent claim to a 
video game output display system was not infringed by a next-generation system that 
worked in a different way. Alpexs claimed system included a display RAM that stored 
information corresponding to each pixel of a television screen in a discrete location. 
Nintendos accused device, by contrast, used shift registers to store one slice of the 
video display at any given time. The Federal Circuit rejected a jury finding that the two 
systems were equivalent.53 In Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.,54 the court 
construed narrowly a patent claim to image arrays storing a two-dimensional slice of 
video data, and which were merged into a composite array storing a fingerprint image. 
The court held that the defendant's systems, which constructed the composite array 
directly rather than by using two-dimensional slices, did not create image arrays within 
the meaning of the claims. Most recently, in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America 
                                                           
52  102 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 
53 Id. at 1222.  To similar effect as Alpex is Wiener v. NEC Elec., Inc., 102 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In 
that case, the Federal Circuit upheld the district courts finding of noninfringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, because there were substantial differences between the patents requirement that a computer 
program call on columns of data one byte at a time and the defendants product, in which the columns 
alleged to be equivalent were not in the data matrix, and therefore were not called upon to read data. The 
court rejected the conclusory declaration of plaintiffs expert that the two processes were identical. 
 
54  149 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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Online,55 the court affirmed a district court decision granting summary judgment of 
noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The patent claims in that case covered 
frames, defined in the specification as pages encoded in character-based protocols. The 
court rejected Wangs attempt to extend the patent to cover bit-mapped pages, crediting 
evidence that there were huge, huge differences between the two approaches.56  
 Other cases have applied the doctrine of equivalents more broadly. In some of 
those cases, the Federal Circuit has found equivalence between two different types of 
software programs written in different product generations. More troubling, some cases 
suggest that software implementations of certain ideas are equivalent to older mechanical 
implementations. An example is Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc.57 The 
patented system claimed a (mechanical) switch connected to a microprocessor, which 
could store the codes of multiple garage doors. The Federal Circuit held that the claim 
was not literally infringed by an electronic switch implemented in software. However, the 
court reversed a grant of summary judgment to the defendants under the doctrine of 
equivalents, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the difference between 
mechanical and software implementations was a mere design choice. WMS Gaming, 
Inc. v. International Game Technology58 is also instructive. In that case, the court held 
that a claim written in means-plus-function language that relied for its corresponding 
                                                           
 
55  197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 
56  Id. at 1386. In a related context (interpreting equivalent structure in a means-plus-function claim), the 
court held that Nintendos video game systems did not infringe GEs television switch patents because the 
patents, written in means-plus-function format, did not disclose a function for the switches identical to 
Nintendos function. General Electric Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999). On how the 
doctrine of equivalents differs from equivalence under a means-plus-function analysis, see Chiuminatta 
Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 
57 194 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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structure on a computer programmed with a particular algorithm was limited in literal 
scope to the particular algorithm chosen and equivalents thereof. However, the court 
found the defendant's algorithm infringing under the doctrine of equivalents. This latter 
approach has the potential to expand the scope of patents in the software industry 
dramatically.59  
Software patents, then, are likely to face serious obviousness hurdles.  The few 
patents that overcome those hurdles need disclose virtually nothing about the detailed 
workings of their invention, and will likely be broadly interpreted to cover a variety of 
mechanisms for implementing the basic software invention. 
 
C. Biotechnology Patent Cases  
 
In contrast to the Federal Circuit decisions regarding software, recent decisions 
involving genetic material have imposed a stringent disclosure standard for patenting 
macromolecules.  The Court has laid particular emphasis on the written description 
requirement of section 112, which requires the patentee to specifically describe the 
claimed invention as part of the disclosure.  The justification for such a detailed 
description is to demonstrate to others of ordinary skill that the inventor in fact has the 
invention in her possession; the assumption being that a sufficiently detailed description 
would not be possible if the inventor were speculating or guessing about its features.60  
                                                                                                                                                                             
58 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 
59   For an argument that a variety of structural tendencies are likely to drive the courts to read software 
patent claims broadly under the doctrine of equivalents, see Cohen & Lemley, supra note __, at 39-50. 
 
60  Of course, in the case of constructive reduction to practice, or filing a paper patent without having 
acutally made the invention, the inventor is in some sense speculating or guessing about the features of an 
invention not yet built.  But even in that instance, the underlying assumption in patent law is that the 
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This requirement is separate from, and potentially more stringent than that of enablement.  
Although the two are closely connected, satisfying one requirement does not necessarily 
satisfy the other.  The classic example offered by one court is the situation in which the 
description of a particular chemical compound enables one of ordinary skill to make 
other, related, compounds, yet those other compounds are not described in the patent 
disclosure.  The first compound is both enabled and described; the others are only 
enabled. 
 This venerable chemical patenting hypothetical has been brought to life by the 
Federal Circuits biotechnology opinions.  For example, in Fiers v. Ravel, the court 
considered the decision of the Patent Office in a three-way interference over patent 
applications drawn to DNA coding for human fibroblast beta-interferon (β-IF).  One of 
the applicants, Ravel, relied for priority upon his Isreali patent application, which 
disclosed methods for isolating a fragment of the DNA sequence coding for β-IF and for 
isolating messenger RNA coding for β-IF.  The court considered, inter alia, whether the 
disclosure in Ravel's Isreali application satisfied the U.S. written description requirement 
so as to form the basis for a U.S. application.  The Federal Circuit upheld a determination 
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that Revels disclosure was not an 
adequate description, largely because it failed to disclose the nucleotide sequence for the 
DNA molecule at issue.  According to the court's reasoning, disclosing a method for 
obtaining the molecule was not the same as disclosing the molecule itself: 
An adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a mere 
statement that it is part of the invention and a reference to a potential 
method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself. 
. . . A bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it can be obtained by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
inventor has the invention mentally, and so can give a sufficiently detailed description of that inventive 
conception  physically creating the invention is mere  
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reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that Revel 
was in possession of the DNA.61 
 
 Since the Ravel application did not disclose the sequence for the molecule 
claimed, the court characterized it as disclosing merely a wish, or arguably a plan, for 
obtaining the DNA.62  A similar conclusion was reached in a subsequent Eli Lilly v. 
Genentech,  where the patent at issue was drawn to a microorganism carrying the DNA 
sequence coding for human insulin, and supported this claim by disclosing a method for 
obtaining the human cDNA, as well as the amino acid sequences for the insulin protein.  
But relying on the Fiers opinion, the court concluded that the written description 
requirement again was not met: Describing a method of preparing a cDNA or even 
describing the protein the cDNA encodes, as the example does, does not necessarily 
describe the DNA iteslf.63 
In reaching these holdings, the Federal Circuit has been adamant that the degree 
of specificity required for an adequate description of nucleic acids requires structure, 
formula, chemical name, or physical properties.64  In Eli Lilly, because [n]o sequence 
information indicating which nucleotides constitute human cDNA appears in the patent . . 
. the specification does not provide a written description of the invention . . . .65  The 
court in such cases seems particularly incensed by applicants who designate a 
macromolecule by English nomenclature, such as vertebrate insulin cDNA:  
  A definition by function . . . is only an indication of what a 
gene does, rather than what it is.  It is only a definition of a 
useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that 
                                                           
61  984 F.2d at 1170-71. 
62  Id. 
63 119 F.3d at 1567. 
64  984 F.2d at 1170 
65  119 F.3d at 1567. 
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result.  Many such genes may achieve that result.  The 
description requirement of the patent statute requires a 
description of an invention, not an indication of a result that 
one might achieve if one made that invention.  
Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to 
exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material 
consists of, is not a description of that material.66 
 
Such failure to describe more than one or two nucleotides is a particular problem 
where the patent claims are drawn to a broad class of nucleotides.  For example, Revel's 
claim covered all DNA molecules that code for β-IF, but: [c]laiming all DNAs that 
achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the 
description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.67  
The construction of the written description requirement as requiring precise sequence 
data gains particular significance whenever claims are drawn to an entire genus, or 
family, of molecules.  The patent discussed in the Lilly written description analysis 
claimed a broad family of DNA molecules coding for insulin in different mammalian 
species, but it disclosed only one species of DNA, that coding for rat insulin.  The court 
held this to be insufficient to describe the broad class of cDNAs coding for mammalian 
or vertebrate insulin.  Although declining to specify exactly what would be needed to 
support a broad claim, the court cited previous chemical cases dealing with related groups 
of small molecules.  Based on these cases, the court declared that macromolecules should 
be treated in the same fashion; the patentee need not not show every member of a claimed 
genus, but is required to show a "representative" number of cDNAs, illustrating or 
defining the common structural features of a "substantial" portion of the genus. 
                                                           
66  Id. 
67  at 1171 
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 A similarly broad claim was rejected in the Amgen case as failing the standard for 
enablement.68  There, the patentee claimed nucleic acid sequences coding for the protein 
erythropoetin, or for other proteins with the same biological function.  The trial judge 
concluded that because Amgen was unable to specify which of these analogs might have 
the biological properties claimed, the claims were not enabled.  The Federal Circuit 
panel, however, that the district court had reached the right conclusion for the wrong 
reason: Whereas the district court focused on the thousands of EPO analogs that could be 
created by substituting amino acid residues in the polypeptide chain, the appellate court 
focused on the patentee's failure to disclose the DNA molecules that would code for those 
analogs.  Since the claims were directed to DNA sequences, the issue was not the 
enablement of the EPO analogs, but rather the enablement of the myriad DNA sequences, 
which the court held could not be made and used on the basis of a few examples. 
 The same concerns that characterize the Federal Circuits jurisprudence of 
biotechnology disclosure  the inadequacy of methodological disclosure, the requirement 
to specify sequence or structure, and uncertainty of selection within large classes of 
homologous molecules -- have shaped the Federal Circuits jurisprudence of 
biotechnology.  However, in the case of obviousness, the issue has been the presence of 
such factors in the prior art, rather than in inventors disclosure.  Thus, the Federal Circuit 
held in In re Bell that a claim to DNA coding for human insulin-like growth factor (hIGF) 
was not obvious although the prior art disclosed the amino acid sequence for the hIGF 
proteins and a method for using that information to obtain the corresponding DNA 
molecule.69  Under similar facts in In re Deuel, the court found claims directed to DNA 
                                                           
68  927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
69  991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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coding for heparin binding growth factors (HBGFs) were not obvious in light of prior art 
disclosure of a partial amino acid sequences and a method for using that information to 
obtain the corresponding DNA molecule.70 
Each decision rested largely upon the courts perception that the actual sequence 
of the claimed DNA molecules was uncertain or unpredictable from the prior art.  In both 
cases the court dismissed as irrelevant the biological relationship between the molecules 
disclosed in the prior art and those claimed by the patent.  The amino acid sequences of 
the proteins disclosed in the prior art are ultimately determined by the sequence of RNA 
nucleotides coding for the protein, which is in turn determinative of the cDNA claimed in 
the patent.71  The correspondence of nucleotide sequences to amino acid sequences is 
well known as key to the central dogma of molecular biology: the transfer of genetic 
information from DNA to RNA to protein chains.  However, certain amino acids can 
correspond to more than one nucleotide sequence, introducing uncertainty into the 
inverse relationship: that of amino acid sequence to nucleotide sequence.  Because of this 
redundancy or degeneracy in the genetic code, the court noted in Bell that a vast 
number of possible sequences  about 1036  might code for the protein sequences 
disclosed in the prior art.  The plaintiff claimed only one of these, in essence having 
searched among a large number of possibilities to select the particular sequence coding 
for hIGF. 
 Numerous commentators have pointed out that such a search is relatively routine.  
But prior art disclosure of method, even admittedly obvious method, was held insufficient 
                                                           
70  51 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
71  Neither In re Bell nor In re Deuel dealt with genomic DNA (gDNA) sequences, which are transcribed by 
cellular proteins to produce a messenger RNA molecule.  Both cases considered non-naturally occurring 
cDNA sequences, which are reverse transcribed from messenger RNAs.  The correspondence between 
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to cure such uncertainty of structure.   In rejecting the DNA claims in Bell and Deuel, 
the PTOs focus on known methods for potentially isolating the claimed DNA 
molecules is also misplaced because the claims at issue define compounds, not 
methods."72  Prior to Bell, the opinion in Amgen had stressed the uncertainty of the 
methods for gene location available at the time of invention: [I]t might have been 
feasible, perhaps obvious to try, to successfully probe a human gDNA library with a 
monkey cDNA probe, it does not not indicated that the gene could have been identified 
and isolated with any success. . . . there was no reasonable expectation of success in 
obtaining the EPO gene by the method that Lin eventually used.73  By the time of the 
research at issue in Bell, such methods for searching a large universe of molecules were 
perhaps painstaking and time-consuming, but had an established likelihood of success.   
Yet the court defined the issue in Bell and Deuel not as a matter of the uncertainty 
of obtaining a particular sequence, but of the uncertainty of predicting or visualizing from 
the prior art what sequence would be found.  Even in the Amgen opinion, the court hinted 
that the key to obviousness lay in the prediction of an exact sequence, as [n]either the 
DNA nucleotide sequence nor its exact degree of homology with the monkey EPO gene 
was known at the time.74  And in Deuel, the court explicitly held that until the claimed 
molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would have been highly unlikely for one 
of ordinary skill in the art to contemplate what was ultimately obtained.  What cannot be 
contemplated or conceived cannot be obvious.75  Thus a likelihood, or even a certainty 
                                                                                                                                                                             
gDNA and RNA may be very different than than that of cDNA to RNA, especially in eukaryotic organisms 
where the processing of RNA transcripts may be extensive. 
72  51 F.3d at 1558; see also 991 F.2d at 785 (same). 
73  927 F.2d at 1208. 
74  927 F.2d at 1208-09. 
75  51 F.3d at 1558 (emphasis added). 
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of finding a DNA molecule with particular properties was deemed essentially irrelevant 
to whether structural claims to that molecule are obvious. 
The corollary to this holding is that a molecule will be obvious if the sequence, 
and not particular function, are discernible in the prior art.  Prior art description of the 
general idea of the claimed molecules, their function, and their general chemical 
nature76 is insufficient to render a molecule obvious.  Some commentators have 
suggested that this requirement for obviousness stands some danger of collapsing into the 
standard for anticipation: under section 102 of the Patent Act, an invention lacks 
patentable novelty if is elements are fully described in a prior art reference, and the 
Federal Circuits obviousness requirement could be read to require such a prior art 
anticipation as the effective standard for obviousness.77  But unlike the requirements for 
anticipation, the Federal Circuits biotechnology obviousness standard appears to require 
that the sequence of the DNA be predictable from the prior art, and not necessarily 
explicitly described.  For example, the court in Deuel suggests that a protein of 
sufficiently small size and simplicity, so that lacking redundancy, each possible DNA 
would be obvious over the protein.78  Although the Federal Circuit has not explicitly 
held so, one would also suspect that disclosure in the prior art of a substantial number of 
homologous sequences would render a new homologue predictable, and so render it 
obvious  just as the court has held that disclosure of a substantial number of homologues 
enough to satisfy the written description requirement for that genus. 
                                                           
76  51 F.3d at 1558. 
77  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has several times suggested that the two patent standards are closely linked, 
characterizing obviousness as a sort of continuum with anticipation as the "epitome" or "ultimate" endpoint 
of obviousness.  See, e.g., Jones v. Hardy 727 F.2d 1524  (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Baxter Travenol Labs, 952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
78  51 F.3d at 1559. 
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Note that these holdings are all of a piece with the courts earlier holdings, such as 
the rejection, on disclosure grounds, of Revels claim to all DNA sequences coding for β-
IF.  Due to degeneracy in the genetic code, Revel could not adequately describe the 
claimed invention as DNA coding for β-IF; an astronomically large number of possible 
sequences might do so.  And if a functional or narrative description in a patent is 
insufficient to properly describe a DNA molecule coding for β-IF, so the presence of a 
functional or narrative description of β-IF protein in the prior art would be insufficient to 
render the molecule obvious: according to the court, one cannot describe what one has 
not conceived, and what cannot be contemplated or conceived cannot be obvious.  Just as 
disclosure in a patent of a method for obtaining a particular cDNA is inadequate to 
properly describe the invention, so disclosure in the prior art of a method for obtaining a 
particular cDNA cannot render the claimed invention obvious. 
The conceptual linkage of obviousness and enablement to the depiction of 
macromolecular sequences in, respectively, the prior art or the patent disclosure, dictates 
a particular and predictable result for the availabilty and scope of such biotechnology 
patents.  The expected outcome is that DNA patents will be extremetly narrow but 
numerous.  Under the Federal Circuit's precedent, a researcher will be able to claim only 
sequences disclosed under the stringent written description -- the actual sequence in hand, 
so to speak.  At the same time, the inventor is shielded from obviousness by the lack of 
such explicit and detailed disclosure in the prior art.  This lack of effective prior art seems 
to dictate that anyone who has isolated and characterized a DNA molecule is certain to 
receive a patent on it.  But the inventor is certain to receive a patent only on that 
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molecule, as the Federal Circuit appears to regard other related molecules as inadequately 
described until their is sequence is disclosed. 
 The set of axioms underlying this set of results forms a logical framework that can 
be predictably extended to other biotechnology inventions besides DNA.  For example, 
one would conclude from the Federal Circuit's analysis that a cDNA should be obvious in 
light of its corresponding mRNA, since the former is reverse transcribed from the latter, 
and there is no redundancy or degeneracy in the correspondence between the nucleotides 
in the two molecules.79  However, an mRNA or corresponding cDNA needd not render 
obvious the genomic DNA (gDNA) from which is is derived, since in many organisms, 
the gDNA will include intervening sequences, or introns, that are not predictable from the 
mRNA sequence. 
 Perhaps more important than the extension of the Federal Circuit's logic to other 
classes of molecules is the extension of its logic to other patent doctrines.   For example, 
as we have indicated with regard to software, the infringement doctrine of equivalents is 
directly linked to the standard for obviousness: the patentee is prevented from capturing 
by equivalents subject matter that would have been obvious at the time he obtained his 
patent.80  Given the very parsimonious reading that the Federal Circuit gives to 
biotechnology obviousness, there should be enormous latitude for findings of equivalence 
in nucleotide infringement cases.  The overall result would seem to be an unsustainable 
configuration of patentability, in which large numbers of narrow patents, with broad 
scopes of equivalence, blanket biotechnology research. 
                                                           
79  L. STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 132 (3d ed. 1988); J.WATSON et al., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF 
THE GENE 610-11 (4th ed. 1987). 
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II. Explanation for the difference - PHOSITA 
 
A. The Role of  the PHOSITA 
 
Our survey of the biotechnology and the software patent cases highlights an 
important reciprocal relationship between obviousness and disclosure.  In biotechnology, 
where highly detailed disclosure is required to satisfy the enablement and written 
description standards, similarly detailed disclosure is required to render the invention 
obvious.  In software, where little specific detail is needed to satisfy the requirements of 
disclosure, similarly little detail is needed to render the invention obvious.  In each case, 
the court takes the patentability requirements of non-obviousness and disclosure as firmly 
tied to a common standard. 
 The common standard connecting these requirements is that under each statutory 
section, the respective requirements must be addressed with regard to the "person having 
ordinary skill in the art," sometimes known by the acronym of PHOSITA.81  Much of the 
caselaw concerning the PHOSITA arises out of the consideration of the obviousness 
standard found in section 103 of the patent statute.82  Although originally developed as a 
common law doctrine, the non-obviousness criterion was codified in the 1956 Patent Act 
                                                                                                                                                                             
80  Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffery & Ass., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (testing  
equivalence by inquiring whether a hypthetical claim encompassing the accused product would have been 
obvious at the time of invention). 
81 John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA -- The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc'y 37 (1991); see generally R. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
§ 4.3 (5th ed. 2001) 
82   35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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as a requirement that the claimed invention, taken as a whole not be obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.   
 The PHOSITA is equally central to calibrating the legal standard for patent 
disclosure.  As the quid pro quo for her period of exclusive rights over an invention, the  
inventor must fully disclose the invention to the public.  The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 
sec. 112 requires that this disclosure enable any person skilled in the art in the art to 
make and use the claimed invention. The language this section therefore indicates that the 
inventors compliance with the requirement of enablement should be measured with 
reference to a standard similar or identical to that in section 103; indeed, the language 
appears to tie the enablement requirement to non-obviousness via this shared metric.  
This same language set the metric for several related disclosure doctrines as well.  
First, the definition of enablement effects the patentablity requirement of specific utility, 
as the invention must operate as described in the specification if the inventor is to  
enabled one of ordinary skill to use it.  Additionally, compliance with the independent 
requirements of description and best mode disclosure are measured with reference to the 
understanding of a person skilled in the art.  And finally, the definiteness of patent 
claims, which must be written so as to warn members of the public just what is and is not 
covered by the patent, are assessed with regard to the knowledge of one having ordinary 
skill in the art -- if the terms of the claims would not be comprehensible to such a person, 
then they fail the requirements of section 112. 
The PHOSITA is nothing if not versatile, and may also show up as a convenient 
metric in other unexpected areas, including judicially created patent doctrines.  For 
example, the PHOSITA reappears in some formulations of the standard for infringement 
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by equivalents. In its germinal opinion on the doctrine of equivalents, Graver Tank, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the equivalence between elements of an allegedly 
infringing device and those of a claimed invention might be tested by determining 
whether the such elements were known in the art to be substitutes for one another.83  A 
great deal of patent law thererfore rests upon the measurement of some legal parameter 
against the skill and knowledge of the PHOSITA.  
This is not to say the PHOSITA has any actual skill or knowledge.  Like her 
cousin, the reasonably prudent person,84 the PHOSITA is something of a juridical 
doppelganger,85 embodying a legal standard for patentability rather than the actual 
capability of any individual or group of individuals.  Courts have on occasion equated the 
knowledge of a given individual, such as a patent examiner, with that of the PHOSITA.  
But fine line between taking the skill of an examiner or other artisan as probative 
evidence of the level of skill in the art, and equating the skill of such persons with the 
characteristics of the hypothetical PHOSITA. 
This places the standard for patentablity on a legally objective, rather than 
subjective, footing.  The PHOSITA standard measures the inventors achievements 
against a judicially determined external metric, rather than against an expectation based 
on whatever level of skill the inventor might actually possess.  The standard also has the 
practical effect, since the question is one of law, of avoiding the requirement that judges 
and other arbiters of patentability be experts in a given field.  The PHOSITA standard is 
                                                           
83 Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 339 U.S. 605 (S. Ct. 1950) 
84 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co. 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (comparing the PHOSITA to the 
"reasonable man.") 
85 Id. (characterizing the PHOSITA as a "ghost."). 
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thus an ultimate conclusion of law based upon evidence,86 but not dictated by the 
capabilities or knowledge of the Patent Office examiner, a reviewing judge, or even that 
of the inventor: 
  Realistically, courts never have judged patentablity by what 
the real inventor/applicant/patentee could or would do.  
Real inventors, as a class, vary in their capacities from 
ignorant geniuses to Nobel Laureates; the courts have 
always applied a standard based on an imaginary worker of 
their own devising whom they have equated with the 
inventor.87 
 
The standard is thus objective in the sense that it does not inquire into a particular 
inventor or artisans level of skill.  But this does not mean that it is static or fixed.  This 
definition offers courts a number of consitutent factors that may be adjusted to modulate 
the requirements for patentability under different circumstances.  The first of these is the 
definition of the particular art in which the PHOSITA is deemed to have ordinary skill.  
The PHOSITA is generally portrayed as having comprehensive knowledge of the 
references in the particular art.  But the parameters of the art are subject to fluctuation, 
and thus so is the size and depth of the library of references with which the PHOSITA is 
presumed to be familiar.  For example, in the case of a DNA patent, is the relevant art 
biochemistry or molecular biology, or biology in general?  Courts have attempted to 
avoid drawing such boundaries by defining the PHOSITA's knowledge as that reasonably 
pertinent to the problem the inventor was trying to solve.  But this requires that the court 
engage in the equally mercurial exercise of defining of the problem that the inventor had 
under consideration. 
                                                           
86 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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A second circumstantial variable is the level of skill that would be considered 
ordinary.  Unlike the inventor, who almost by definition is presumed to be one of 
extraordinary skill,88 the PHOSITA standard contemplates some median level of skill.  In 
assessing that median level, courts may take into account a long list of factors, including 
the approaches found in the prior art, the sophistication of the technology involved, the 
rapidity of innovation in that field, and the level of education typical of those in the 
field.89  The courts have also endowed the PHOSITA with mediocre personality traits; 
she is conceived of as an entity that adopts conventional approaches to problem solving, 
and is not inclined to innovate, either via exceptional insight or painstaking labor.90   
Some care must be exercised in characterizing the PHOSITA, as it is tempting to 
do so on the basis of an unfounded presumption, which is that the PHOSITA remains 
constant from section to section of the patent statute. On the contrary, some 
commentators have recognized as quite possible the possibility that the imaginary artisan 
found in these different statutory sections, though bearing the same denomination, might 
well display different and even inconsistent characteristics as between the different 
sections.91  The PHOSITA for purposes of obviousness may not necessarily be the 
PHOSITA for purposes of enablement, written description, definiteness, or equivalence.  
Because she is a legal construct designated to embody certain legal standards, the 
PHOSITA could well change depending on the purpose she is serving at the time. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
87  Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  See Hodosh v. Block 
Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (actual inventors cannot be required to have the omniscience of 
the figurative person of ordinary skill); In re Nilssen 
88 Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
89 See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Barnes-Hind, Inc., 796 F.2d 443 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (listing pertinent 
factors); see also Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok Ltd, 208 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (district court erred by 
failing to consider these factors). 
90  Standard Oil Co. V. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
91   See Tresansky, supra note __ at 52-53. 
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Perhaps because we have the most caselaw discussing the PHOSTIA in the 
contexts of obviousness and of enablement, some dispararity in fact appears in the 
judicial characterization of the PHOSITA for purposes of these issues.  The section 103 
PHOSITA appears to be something of a problem solver, who the courts set to work 
hypothetically solving the problem solved by the inventor.92  To be sure, the obviousness 
PHOSITA is not an especially inspired problem solver, as he is imagined to remain stuck 
in the rut of conventional thinking.93  By contrast, the PHOSITA of the first paragraph of 
section 112 shows no such innovative tendency, but is simply a user of the technology.  If 
the enablement PHOSITA shows any problem solving ability, it is in tapping the prior art 
to fill in gaps left by the inventors disclosure  a rather different skill than that of the 
obviousness PHOSITA.94  The two PHOSITAs also differ in the knowledge imputed to 
them.  The knowledge of one is assessed as of the time of invention, but that of the other 
at the time a patent is filed -- due to the passage of time, the latter universe of references 
is likely to be larger.  But conversely, hidden or non-public references which may serve 
as prior art under section 103 are not necessarily imputed to the knowledge of the 
PHOSITA who make or use the invention under section 112, as such references are not 
readily available to the public.95 
 
 
                                                           
92   See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Grout, 377 F.2d 1019 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
93  Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. 774 F.2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
94  See Tresansky, supra note __ at 54. 
95  Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp. 747 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 
103 (C.C.P.A. 1981) 
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B.  Implication of PHOSITA approach  
 
 Patent law ostensibly offers a single set of standards, which are applied uniformly 
to all patentable subject matter, "anything under the sun made by man."  Yet in another 
sense, every technology is treated individually.  Within the broad confines of patent law, 
the PHOSITA standard offers courts the ability to adapt patent requirements to different 
technologies.  In this sense, patent law is technology specific, in essence offering 
different and fact sensitive standards of disclosure and obviouness to different 
technologies. 
 Yet, recognizing that the PHOSITA standard dictates that different technologies 
will be accomodated in different ways, the developments that we have described in 
software and biotechnology seem to us extraordinary, and well beyond the accomodation 
offered by the PHOSITA standard.  Consider, for example, the extremely stringent 
disclosure standard developed in the biotechnology cases.  Such disclosure would be 
dictated under the PHOSITA analysis in order to assure those of ordinary skill that the 
inventor posessed the invention at the time the application was filed -- apparently, the 
Federal Circuit believes that biotechnology researchers need a very high degree of 
assurance.  Computer programmers, on the other hand, apparently require very little 
assurance -- simply an indication of function will do.  The opposite is true in each case 
with regard to obviousness; the court appears to believe that computer programmers can 
fully envision working code from only a suggestion of function, whereas biotechnologists 
apparently need genetic sequences explicitly spelled out in the prior art to render a 
molecule obvious. 
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Indeed, we wonder about the extension of such doctrine to other technological 
areas.  For example, small-molecule chemistry has long had its own discrete set of 
patentability doctrines, developed in a long line of cases that attempt to accommodate the 
level of skill in that particular technology.96  The rules articulated in this line of cases 
represents something of a compromise compromise between the predictable similarities 
in the characteristics of molecular families and the difficulty in predicting the effect of 
structure in three dimensions.  As a first approximation, structural relatedness between 
molecules disclosed in the prior art and a novel molecule claimed in a patent gives rise to 
a prima facie case of obviousness.97  However, chemical structures depicted two-
dimensionally on paper may not accurately reflect the properties of a physical structure 
that exists in three dimensions -- molecules react with one another in three dimensions, 
and the three dimensional configuration dictates the chemical characteristics of the 
molecule.  Thus, even in small molecules, the three-dimensional complexity arising from 
what appears on paper to be slight changes in structure may give rise to radically 
different properties in apparently related molecules.  Even with three dimensional 
modeling, the effects of such complexity have long been difficult to predict.  Such 
unpredicted characteristics occurred with enough frequency that a rule developed 
allowing a prima facie case of obviousness in small molecules to be rebutted by evidence 
of unpredictable or unexpected properties in the claimed molecule.98  The technological 
assumption built into such a rule appears to be that the PHOSITA in small-molecule 
chemistry can generally predict the properties of a chemcial or group of chemcials, or 
                                                           
96  See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (1990) (recounting history of chemical obviousness cases). 
97 H. WEGNERr, CHEMICAL PATENT PRACTICE (1991). 
98 In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963); see also Harold Wegner, Prima Facie Obviousness of 
Chemical Compounds, 65 Am. Pat. L. Ass'n Q.J. 271 (1978). 
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may occasionally be surprised by their properties, but either outcome is based on the 
molecules' structural depiction. 
The rule in these small molecule cases appears closely related to that announced 
in biotechnology cases discussed here -- the Federal Circuit has declared that DNA "is a 
chemical, albeit a complex one," and has articulated a desire to treat the patenting of 
macromolecules in the same fashion as the patenting of more traditional organic 
molecules.  In focusing upon structural depiction as the linchpin of both obviousness and 
disclosure, the biotechnology cases rely upon, and appear to extend, the line of chemical 
cases summarized above.  But just as we question the application of these rules to 
macromolecules, we are similarly uncertain that these special rules for obviousness in 
small molecule chemical cases are well suited to accommodate current chemical research 
practice, particularly in light of the rules articulated by the Federal Circuit for 
macromolecules.   
In particular, modern techniques of rational drug design and combinatorial 
chemistry seem to push against this traditional construction of chemical obviousness in 
much the same way that the routinization of DNA probing  pushes against the rules of 
patentability in the biotechnology cases.  For example, small-molecule chemists now 
search for useful compounds by first specifying the functions that they hope to find.99  
The characteristics of desirable molecules are represented mathematically, in equations 
depicting functionally equivalent chemical groups and side chains.100  Based on the 
                                                           
99 See generally Hugo Kubinyi, The Quantitative Analysis of Structure-Activity Relationships in 1 Burger's 
Medicinal Chemistry and Drug Discovery 497-571 (Manfred E. Wolff ed. 1995). 
100 Richard B. Silverman, The Organic Chemistry of Drug Design and Drug Action 26-34 (1992) 
(describing the Hansch equation that correlates biological activeing with physicochemical properties of 
drug candidates). 
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predictions of such mathematical models, chemists can then search through large panels 
of related molecules, selecting those with the closest match to predicted function.101 
This methodology closely parallels the type of molecular "search" considered in 
most of the Federal Circuit macromolecule cases, where large libraries of DNA 
molecules are probed in order to identify those that correspond to an expected functional 
characterisitc -- i.e., the propensity to hybridize with probes of a particular nucleotide 
configuration, and concomitantly the capacity to code for cellular production of particular 
gene products.102  Combinatorial chemistry, much like DNA probing, tends to focus upon 
the function of the end product, removing much of the uncertainty from the outcome of a 
search for a desired molecule. but not necessarily from predicting the precise structure of 
the molecule that is ultimately found.  Indeed, role of chemical structure is to some extent 
marginalized, as dissimilar structures with similar functions may be treated as equivalent 
in narrowing the search. 
 
 
 
D. The PHOSITA Standard Has Been Applied Inappropriately in the 
Software and Biotechnology Industries 
 
 Despite the anomalies that we have identified in the cases of biotechnology and of 
software, we continue to believe that the PHOSITA approach in general represents the 
proper standard for patent law.  Basing the proof required on the level of skill in the art 
                                                           
101   See Dinesh V. Patel et al., Applications of Small-Molecule Combinatorial Chemistry to Drug 
Discovery, 1 Drug Discovery Today 134 (1996); Jan J. Scicinski, Chemical Libraries in Drug Discovery, 
134 Trends in Biotechnology 246 (1995); Joseph C. Hogan Jr., Directed Combinatorial Chemistry, 384 
Nature 17S (1996). 
102  See generally  J. WATSON et al., RECOMBINANT DNA 104-07 (2d ed. 1991) (describing techniques 
for probing libraries of cloned genes). 
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makes logical sense.  At the simplest level, this approach patent is intended to benefit the 
public; people who work in a given technology must understand the patent as it relates 
the prior art, so it makes sense to take into account what that person knows in order to 
decide whether a patent is obvious or has been enabled.  From a policy standpoint, the 
practicality of working in different technologies requires a flexible approach to 
determining disclosure or obviousness, and the PHOSITA approach gives a court that 
flexibility.  
 Consequently, in order to identify the source of the anomalies in biotechnology 
and software, we look first to the Federal Circuit's application of this standard, rather than 
to the standard itself.  One possibility, which has occurred to previous commentators as 
well as to us, is that the Federal Circuit application of the PHOSITA standard in these 
technologies is wrong as a matter of science.  One reading of these cases is that the 
Federal Circuit seems to have substituted caricature for a nuanced understanding of the 
technology.  The court has repeatedly suggested that programming itself is a "mere 
clerical function" that presumably does not warrant the grant of a patent.  The court 
seems to consider only the ideas or functions of a computer program worth of patent 
protection.  In short, the court thinks of programmers as of extraordinary skill, capable of 
implementing any idea in a computer program as a matter of course.  Sometimes this 
assumption benefits patentees, notably in enablement and best mode determinations.103  
Other times, notably in obviousness cases, the assumption that programmers are 
extremely skilled works against the patentee.104  But as a matter of computer science, the 
                                                           
103   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (noting the low standards applied to software patents 
under section 112). 
 
104   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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court's assumptions are just wrong.  Any programmer will tell you that coming up with 
an idea for a computer program is rather less than half the battle.105  Programs can take 
years to write even under the best circumstances.  Some will simply not work.  Others 
will require innovative programming techniques.  Even once they are written, most 
programs have bugs that must we worked out in order for the program to be stable.106  
And in many cases, the process of writing the program changes the idea itself in a sort of 
continuous feedback loop.107  Not only is it wrong to say that writing a program is a 
"mere clerical function" to a skilled programmer, but in fact many of the truly innovative 
improvements in computer software occur at the level of programming, not the idea to 
have a computer perform a specific function.108 
In the biotechnology cases, problem is the opposite; the court focuses repeatedly 
on the "uncertainty" inherent in the field, scoffing at claims drawn to molecular function, 
and demanding precise disclosure of any embodiment.109  The court seems to believe that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
105   A good judicial discussion of this is Computer Assoc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).  See 
also 3 Nimmer on Copyright §13.03[F]; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright 
Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045 (1989); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 (1994); Thomas M. 
Gage, Note, Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright Protection for Computer Software 
Structure  Whats the Purpose?, 1987 Wisc. L. Rev. 859.  Cf. Mark A. Lemley & David W. OBrien, 
Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 255, 261-66 (1997) (detailing the cost savings available 
from reusing computer code rather than reinventing it from scratch).   
 
106   See Lemley & OBrien, supra note __, at 261-64 and sources cited therein. 
 
107   See, e.g., Menell, supra note __, at __. 
 
108   See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 255, 302 
(1997) (encouraging protection for such ideas in preference to the more common patents on old ideas 
implemented in digital format).  Indeed, Richard Stern and Julie Cohen have both proposed that software 
patents be limited to innovative programs.  See Julie E. Cohen, Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and 
the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:  Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Technologies, 68 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1169 (1995); Richard H. Stern, Tales From the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, 
Its Déjà vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371, 395 (1991). 
 
109   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing the role of uncertainty in the Federal 
Circuits biotechnology jurisprudence). 
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biotechnology is as much a black art as a science.  In Bell and Deuel the court's belief in 
uncertainty benefits the patentee, since it means that knowledge of a protein and a 
method for deriving the cDNA sequence did not render the cDNA sequence obvious.110  
By contrast, the same assumption about uncertainty hurts patentees in cases like Enzo, 
Lilly and Amgen, because it precludes them from claiming any DNA sequence they have 
not actually described in the patent specification.111  But all of these holdings are based 
on the assumption that one ordinarily skilled in biotechnology cannot get from a protein 
to a DNA sequence, or from the DNA sequence of one mammal to the corresponding 
DNA sequence of another mammal.   
Arguably this understanding of the science of biotechnology is simply wrong.112  
Robert Hodges has argued that the key event is the cloning of the first gene in a family 
of corresponding genes.  Once a researcher accomplishes this very difficult task, the 
researcher can typically obtain other members of the gene family with much less 
effort.113 Indeed, the process is largely automated.  Such research is properly compared 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
110   See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  Cf. 
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (using the same standard in an interference proceeding to 
benefit one applicant at the expense of another).  But cf. In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(DNA sequence in prior art rendered obvious a claim to an altered version of that sequence that changed 
only one amino acid). 
 
111   See Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Regents of the University of 
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 
112   We acknowledge Lawrence Sungs contrary view, that the biotechnology cases are simply decided on 
their individual facts and do not reflect any patterns.  See Sung, supra note __, at 107; John W. Schlicher, 
Biotechnology and the Patent System: Patent Law and Procedures for Biotechnology, Health Care and 
Other Industries, 4 Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 121, 127 (1996) (I do not understand the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit to have created a subset of patent law doctrines for biotechnology.).  But the cases 
seem to us much more consistently to depart from the standards applied in other industries. 
 
113   Robert A Hodges, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a Mere Wish or Plan Should be Considered 
an Adequate Description of the Invention, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 831, 832 (2001). Also, see John M. Lucas, 
The Doctrine of Simultaneous Conception and Reduction to Practice in Biotechnology: A Double Standard 
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to searching a "black box" in which are contained molecules of known characteristics, if 
unknown structure -- the search is conducted on the basis of what is known, that is, the 
function, rather than on the basis of what is unknown -- the precise structure.  Thus, the 
outcome of such research is predictable with regard to the expected function of the 
molecule that will be found, and the expected success of finding such a molecule.  
This explanation of the Federal Circuits jurisprudence in these areas is not 
altogether satisfactory, as in biotechnology at least, it fails to explain the courts 
indifference to the technology subsequent to Amgen.  The obviousness decision in Amgen 
clearly rested upon the uncertain likelihood of success in the particular probing 
methodology used to find the EPO gene.  Had the court adhered to this analysis in later 
cases, carrying forward into subsequent opinions a static impression of biotechnological 
techniques, the poor fit between patent doctrine and patent policy could be easily 
explained.  But in those later cases, the court seems quite indifferent to the certainty or 
uncertainty of methodological success, fashioning instead a standard based on structural 
precision and foreseeability that ignores the state of technology, past or present.  
This observation might be accommodated by an alternative explanation: that the 
court, rather than stumbling in its application of law to changing technology, is as a 
matter of law simply creating a unique enclave of patent doctrine for biotechnology.  The 
same explanation might be applied to the software cases: that it is not a unique set of 
facts applied to the PHOSITA construct that is generating a technology-specific body of 
patent law, but rather a deliberate manipulation of doctrine itself.  Yet this alternative 
explanation seems to us even less satisfactory than the first -- it essentially moves the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for the Double Helix, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 381, 418 (1998) (making the inventions of Amgen, Fiers and Lilly 
today would be routine). 
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problem up one level of abstraction to argue that the Federal Circuit is not mistaken as a 
matter of fact about the state of technology in biotechnology and software, but rather 
mistaken as a matter of policy about the needs of those industries.  If the court is taking 
the trouble of fashioning individual patentability standards for different areas of subject 
matter, one would expect that the standards fashioned would be suited to the needs of the 
different areas addressed -- yet that seems not to be the case here. 
Yet a third alternative explanation, at least for the biotechnology cases, might be 
found in a sort of judicial economy.  Rather than fashion new doctrines, the Federal 
Circuit biotechnology cases may be an attempt to extend existing chemical patent 
doctrines to encompass biotechnology.  Such an approach has the advantage of legal 
predictability, relying on established precedent with which innovators and their attorneys 
are already familiar.  But this explanation fails to explain why such doctrine should not 
also be extended to encompass software technology  why the explicit listing of 
computer code is not as critical to obviousness or disclosure as the explicit listing of 
genetic code seems to be.  Moreover, all these explanations beg the question of whether 
different technologies ought to have their own specific patenting standards, whether those 
standards are dictated by unique facts, or by legal considerations. 
 If, as we suggest, the concept of the PHOSITA makes sense, why has the Federal 
Circuit got it wrong in these industries?  We think there are several structural barriers that 
make it difficult for courts to accurately assess the level of skill in a complex 
technological art.  First, it is worth emphasizing that judges are at a rather serious 
disadvantage in trying to put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist.  
Judges ordinarily don't have any scientific background, and at least at the district court 
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level most law clerks don't either.  Further, district court judges have extremely full 
dockets with many different types of cases.  The average judge may hear no more than 
one patent case every few years.114  Few of those will be software or biotechnology 
cases.115  So a very busy judge must learn not only patent law but also some difficult 
science in a very short period of time.  Expert witnesses can help, but the Federal Circuit 
has imposed some limits on the extent to which district courts can rely on such 
evidence.116  In particular, courts must avoid the temptation to assume that the expert 
witness is a person ordinarily skilled in the art.117  Even the Federal Circuit, which doesn't 
                                                           
114   There are roughly 1700 patent cases filed per year. The exact data for the years 1995-1999 can be 
found in the Derwent Litalert database, available at 
http://www.derwent.com/intellectualproperty/litalert.html.  The data that follow were compiled as of June 
1, 2000, and involve cases labeled patent. 
 Year Number of Cases Filed 
 1999 1,652 
 1998 1,730 
 1997 1,731 
 1996 1,514 
          1995            1,258 
Most of these cases settle, however.  Kimberly Moores comprehensive study of all patent cases that went 
to trial found only 1,411 cases in the 17 years from 1983 to 1999, an average of less than 100 cases per 
year.  Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases  An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 
Mich. L. Rev. 365, 380 (2000).  Since there are over 600 district court judges in the United States, it is 
obvious that most judges get only a few filed patent cases a year, and well less than one patent trial a year.  
In fact, many judges get even fewer cases than this number would suggest (though others get more), since 
the concentration of innovation in certain regions and the permissibility of forum shopping in patent cases 
cause patent cases to be bunched in a few districts.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent 
Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889 (2001) (analyzing where patent 
suits are filed). 
 
115   See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 217 & Table 5 (1998) (between 1989 and 1996, only 3% of patent cases involved 
biotechnology and only 1% involved software). 
 
116   See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (courts may rely on expert 
testimony in construing patent claims only in rare circumstances); but compare Pitney-Bowes v. Hewlett-
Packard Corp., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (judges may hear expert testimony on the meaning of 
patent claims, but may not normally rely on such testimony).  This distinction between admitting testimony 
to help the judge understand the claims and reliance on such testimony may make conceptual sense, but 
courts reading this line of cases may be reluctant to hear such evidence at all.  Plus, it won't help much in 
deciding pretrial motions.   
 
117   See, e.g., Dayco Prods. v. Total Containment, Inc., __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2001) (our objective 
is to interpret the claims from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, not from the viewpoint of 
counsel or expert witnesses . . .); Endress + Hauser v. Hawk Measurement Sys., 122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 
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suffer nearly so much from these limitations,118 is not in a position to fully understand all 
of the science it encounters.119  Given these limitations, courts understandably won't get it 
right all the time.120 
 Second, the timing of the PHOSITA analysis complicates the court's task.  While 
the court will determine the level of skill in the art during a pretrial hearing or at trial, the 
appropriate level of skill in the art is not what people know at the time of trial, but what 
people knew at the time of the invention.121  On average, it takes more than twelve years 
from the time a patent application is filed until final judgment on the merits; it takes even 
longer from the date of invention, of course.122  So courts trying to determine the level of 
skill in the art must learn not just science, but the history of science.  Courts and expert 
witnesses must shut out of their minds intervening developments in the field.  This is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1997) (The person of ordinary skill in the art is a theoretical construct . . . and is not descriptive of some 
particular individual; experts need not themselves be of ordinary skill in the art). 
 
118   While relatively few Federal Circuit judges have technology backgrounds, see John R. Allison & Mark 
A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 745, 751 
n.23 (2000) (detailing the background of judges on the court in 1996), many of their clerks do.  Further, the 
Federal Circuit has more time to consider each case, has the full record before it, and gets many more 
patent cases (and therefore more software and biotechnology cases) than any district court judge would. 
 
119   Arti Rai argues that the Federal Circuit should defer to the PTO, because the PTO better understands 
biotechnology.  Rai, supra note __, at __.  We agree with her that the Federal Circuit makes mistakes in 
this area.  We are not persuaded that the PTO can do any better, however, particularly given the minimal 
time examiners can spend on any one invention.  See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming October 2001) (examiners spend 18 hours per application on 
average). 
 
120   Cf. Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevskys Watch: Some Notes From the 
Intellectual Property Front, 78 Va. L. Rev. 129, 132 (1992) (worrying that judges may not be particularly 
good at judicial anthropology). 
 
121   See Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (PHOSITA analysis 
must focus on conditions as they existed when the invention was made in obviousness cases).   
 
122   Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note __, at 236 Table 11 (12.3 years on average).  This 
has been a particular problem in biotechnology cases, particularly because they spend longer in 
prosecution.  See, e.g., Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (16-year-old 
invention); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (18-year-old 
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notoriously hard to do.  Empirical evidence has demonstrated that people in general, and 
judges in particular, are subject to a "hindsight" bias: they are likely to reason backwards 
from what did happen to make assumptions about what was likely to happen ex ante.123  
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly recognized the problem of hindsight bias in its 
obviousness jurisprudence,124 and has built rules designed to cope with it there,125 but in 
fact hindsight bias risks infecting the PHOSITA analysis in enablement and claim scope 
as well.  Hindsight bias will normally lead factfinders to overestimate the level of skill in 
the art, since subsequent advances will suggest that the invention couldn't have been that 
difficult to do.  Occasionally, however, hindsight bias may have the opposite effect, 
notably where certain things known or believed at one time to be feasible turn out later to 
be more difficult than anticipated.126   
                                                                                                                                                                             
invention); Jeffrey S. Dillen, DNA Patentability  Anything But Obvious, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 1023, 1038 
(noting this time lag). 
 
123   There is an interesting empirical literature in the behavioral law and economics movement on hindsight 
bias.  The existence of such a bias is well documented.  In the behavioral science literature, see, e.g., 
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight & Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, 1 J. Experimental Psychol.: Hum. Perception & Performance 288 (1975); Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psych. 
207 (1973).  In the legal literature, see, e.g., Cass Sunstein ed., Behavioral Law and Economics (2000); 
Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955, 2000 (2001); Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1095 (2000).  There is even empirical evidence that federal judges are subject to 
hindsight bias.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001). 
 
124   See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intl, 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Monarch Knitting Machinery 
Corp. v. Fukuhara Indus. & Trading Co., 139 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 
125   See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Our case law makes clear that the best 
defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a highsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous 
application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art 
references.).  Indeed, the Federal Circuit may have overcompensated, making it very difficult to combine 
references in order to prove obvious.  See Lemley & O'Brien, supra note __, at 301 (making this argument).  
For an extremely strict statement of the legal standard on combining references, see Winner Intl Royalty 
Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 
126   For a detailed discussion of hindsight in biotechnology cases, see Lawrence M. Sung, On Treating Past 
as Prologue, 2001 U. Ill. J. L., Tech. & Poly 75. 
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 Finally, the backward-looking nature of the legal system itself creates a problem 
that is in some sense the opposite of the hindsight bias.  Legal rules are based on stare 
decisis.  The law accumulates nuance over time by respecting and building on the body of 
existing precedent.  Only rarely will courts expressly reject their prior decisions.  This 
system has worked well over time in producing thoughtful legal rules.127  Judges trained 
in this process will naturally tend to apply it to factual issues they see repeatedly as well.  
Indeed, doing so seems economical as well, since revisiting those factual determinations 
appears redundant.  Thus, once the Federal Circuit has ruled on the level of skill in a 
particular art, the temptation is strong for both that court and district courts to apply that 
determination in subsequent cases as well.  This tendency is evident in both software and 
biotechnology cases.  In the software cases, the court in Northern Telecom held that the 
patentee needn't disclose the actual code implementing a program in order to satisfy the 
enablement or best mode requirements.  The court in that case acknowledged that 
determinations of the level of skill in the computer industry should be made on a case-by-
case basis.128  But subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have not inquired separately into 
the level of skill in the art, or explored the complexity of the program before them in 
much detail.  Instead, they have tended to rely on prior cases holding that code need not 
be disclosed.  In biotechnology the linkage is even stronger.  In re Bell concluded that 
knowledge of an amino acid sequence produced by a gene, coupled with a plan for 
identifying the DNA sequence of the gene, did not render the DNA sequence itself 
                                                           
127   For arguments suggesting the common law evolves towards efficiency over time, see Richard A. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 23-27 (1st ed. 1979); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process 
and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law 
Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977). 
 
128   908 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990). 
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obvious.129  In re Deuel relied on Bell's conclusion, despite the fact that biotechnology 
had advanced somewhat between the two inventions.130  And in Regents of the University 
of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,131 the court expressly relied on its conclusions about the 
level of skill in the art in Bell and Deuel to determine its conclusions regarding written 
description.132  Fiers is even more explicit in this regard, creating a firm rule that 
conception of a DNA sequence requires a listing of that sequence regardless of the 
complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation.133 
 While apparently logical, the reliance on industry-specific precedent in 
determining the level of skill in the art is problematic.  First, while both obviousness and 
enablement rely on the PHOSITA construct, the PHOSITA is not necessarily the same 
for obviousness and enablement even in a single case.  Obviousness is tested at the time 
                                                           
129   In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 
130   In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  In Bell, the prior art disclosed the amino acid 
sequence for the proteins of interest, and a method for cloning genes.  By contrast, the art in Deuel 
disclosed only a partial sequence.  Nontheless, the passage of time between the priority dates of the 
applications  almost 10 years [check]  was ignored by the court, which did not focus on or even mention 
when the inventions occurred.   
 
131   Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 
132   Id. at 1567: 
Example 6 provides the amino acid sequence of the human insulin A and B chains, but that 
disclosure also fails to describe the cDNA. Recently, we held that a description which renders 
obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that 
invention. Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572, 41 USPQ2d at 1966. We had previously held that a claim 
to a specific DNA is not made obvious by mere knowledge of a desired protein sequence and 
methods for generating the DNA that encodes that protein. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 
1558, 34 USPQ2d 1210, 1215 (1995) ("A prior art disclosure of the amino acid sequence of a 
protein does not necessarily render particular DNA molecules encoding the protein obvious 
because the redundancy of the genetic code permits one to hypothesize an enormous number of 
DNA sequences coding for the protein."); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785, 26 USPQ2d 1529, 1532 
(Fed.Cir.1993). Thus, a fortiori, a description that does not render a claimed invention obvious 
does not sufficiently describe that invention for purposes of § 112, ¶ 1. Because the '525 
specification provides only a general method of producing human insulin cDNA and a description 
of the human insulin A and B chain amino acid sequences that cDNA encodes, it does not provide 
a written description of human insulin cDNA. 
 
133     Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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the invention was made, while enablement is tested at the time the application was filed.  
Clearly the application cannot be filed until after the date of invention, and in some cases 
several years elapse between the two.134  The knowledge in the art can change during this 
period, sometimes dramatically.  Second, and more important, the level of skill in the art 
will normally change between the dates of different inventions.  It is hazardous, therefore, 
to rely on one court's statement of the level of skill in the art as determinative or even 
evidentiary of the level of skill in the same art at a different time.  The level of skill in the 
art is a factual question that must be determined anew on the particulars of each case.135 
 
III. Should Patent Law Be Technology-Specific? 
 If we are right that the nominally unified standards of patent law are in fact 
technology-specific because they rely so heavily on the level of skill in the art, the 
question remains whether this heterogeneity is desirable.  In the last section, we 
suggested that the Federal Circuit has, either as a matter of fact or as a conclusion of law,  
improperly characterized the level of skill in the art in the biotechnology and software 
industries.  But even if these problems are overcome, there seems little question that the 
effect of reliance on the PHOSITA will be to impose different standards in different 
industries.  In section A, we discuss the policy implications of this approach for software 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
134   The law permits a one year grace period between any public act and the filing of a patent application.  
35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  But many inventors wait even longer between invention and the filing of an 
application.  This is permissible, so long as they do not put the invention on sale or in public use in the 
interim, and do not abandon it.  35 U.S.C. § 102(c). 
 
135   For a detailed discussion, see Dillen, supra note __, at 1039-44.  The CCPA recognized this in In re 
Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1250 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and the Federal Circuit in Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, Inc., 
188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  But it has proven a hard rule to adhere to. 
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and biotechnology.  In section B, we discuss the more general implications of patent-
specificity for patent reform. 
 
A. The Proper Scope of Software and Biotechnology Patents    
Nonobviousness is a function of uncertainty.136 Where uncertainty is higher, 
courts should lower the standard of patentability to compensate for the risk of failure (and 
therefore the lower expected reward per dollar invested).  While courts have traditionally 
focused on uncertainty and hence obviousness as a function of invention, in fact 
invention is rewarded in the marketplace only to the extent it is embodied in a successful 
commercial product that can be sold at a price above marginal cost.  Getting from an 
invention to a successful product requires many more steps: developing the product, 
testing it, producing it, marketing it, and in many cases developing complementary 
products or even whole new industries that can take advantage of the invention in the 
most efficient way.  The entire process of research, development, and turning an idea into 
a finished product can be described as innovation.  Invention is thus a subset of 
innovation.137 
Under this model of obviousness, uncertain and high-cost innovation  not just 
invention  should more likely be entitled to a determination of nonobviousness.  High 
cost will tend to correlate with higher risks, as the larger investment increases the 
opportunity for loss at any probability of success.  The greater variance in outcomes 
might be expected to deter the rational entrepreneur from investing in such high cost 
                                                           
136   For a detailed elucidation of the ideas in this paragraph, see Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the 
Standard of Patentability, 7 High Tech. L.J. 1 (1992). 
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projects unless the expected reward is correspondingly greater.  This higher level of 
perceived risk may be to some extent counterbalanced by lowering the standard for 
patentability of high-cost projects, increasing the likelihood of financial reward. 
 Application of this innovation-based model to software and biotechnology reveals 
problems with the current legal standards.  As we have seen, the courts have portrayed 
computer programming as relatively straightforward and biotechnology as more 
uncertain.  As a result, software patents are more likely to be found obvious, but if valid 
tend to be broad in scope and require only minimal disclosure.138  Biotechnology patents, 
by contrast, are relatively easy to prove nonobvious but require detailed disclosure and 
are extremely narrow.139  Arguably this result is exactly backwards as a matter of 
innovation policy.  As we shall see, common policy arguments responding to market 
conditions peculiar to the two industries call for narrow software patents and broad 
biotech patents.  At a minimum, the PHOSITA test -- even if correctly applied -- will not 
produce the results that seem optimal for each industry. 
 
 1. Optimal Software Patent Policy 
 The computer industry is characterized by a large number of rapid, iterative 
improvements on existing products.140  Computer programs normally build on preexisting 
                                                                                                                                                                             
137   In using this typology, we follow William Kingston.  See William Kingston ed., Direct Protection of 
Innovation (1987). 
 
138   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
 
139   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
 
140   See, e.g., Cohen & Lemley, supra note __, at 40-42; Menell, supra note __; Samuelson et al., supra 
note __. 
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ideas, and often on prior code itself.141  This incremental improvement is desirable for a 
variety of reasons.  First, it responds to the hardware-based architectural constraints of 
the software industry.  Data storage capacity, processing speed, and transmission rates 
have all increased steadily over time.142  Programs written during an older period 
therefore faced capacity constraints that disappear over time.  It makes sense to improve 
those products progressively as the constraints that limit the functionality of the programs 
disappear.  Second, incremental improvement of existing programs and ideas tends to 
render programs more stable.  It is received wisdom that you should avoid version 1.0 of 
any software product, because its maker is unlikely to have all the bugs worked out.  
Iterative programs built on a single base tend to solve these problems over time.  This is 
most obviously true when actual computer code is reused, but it is true even when tested 
algorithms or structures are replicated in new programs.  Third, iterative improvement 
helps preserve interoperability, both among generations of the same program and across 
programs.143   
                                                           
141   On reuse of existing code, both within and across companies, see Lemley & O'Brien, supra note __. 
 
142   Moore's law provides that historically the speed of microprocessors has doubled every 18 months.  It 
is well known that data storage capacity and transmission rates have shown similarly exponential increases. 
 
143   For the same reason, reverse engineering has had a respected place as a legitimate means of creating 
interoperability. Virtually all recent copyright decisions have endorsed reverse engineering in some 
circumstances. E.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 
Inc. 49 F.3d 807, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of 
America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988); DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359 (E.D. Va. 1997); Mitel, Inc. v. 
Iqtel, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Colo. 1995), affd on other grounds, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997). On 
the other hand, a few early decisions rejected compatibility as a justification for copying. E.g., Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Digital Communications Assn 
v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); cf. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse 
Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (acknowledging the right to reverse engineer for 
some purposes, but holding it unjustified in this case). 
 As with courts, the overwhelming majority of commentators endorse a right to reverse engineer 
copyrighted software, at least for certain purposes.  E.g., Jonathan Band & Masanobu Katoh, 
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 The software industry also has relatively low fixed costs and a short time to 
market.  The archetypal software invention is one made by two people working in a 
garage.144  While the costs of writing software have increased substantially over time as 
programs became more complex, the costs of writing and manufacturing computer 
programs are still low relative to the fixed costs of development in many industries.  
Further, computer program life cycles are rapid.  Unlike industries like steel or aircraft, 
where new generations of products are infrequent and products may last for decades, 
computer programs tend to be replaced every few years, often by new versions of the 
same program.   
 The implications of these economic characteristics for patent law are threefold.  
First, the need for strong patent protection is somewhat less for software inventions than 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Property and Interoperability in the Global Software 
Industry 167-226 (1995); Cohen, supra note __; Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., 
Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer Software:  Reverse Engineering, Protection, and 
Disclosure, 22 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 61 (1996); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 975, 1016-18 
(1994); Maureen A. ORourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:  Copyright 
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 Duke L.J. 479, 534 (1995); David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond:  
A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least as Far As It Goes, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1131, 1168 (1994); 
Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form:  
The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 49 (1993); Tyler G. Newby, Note, 
What's Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere:  Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate International 
Copyright Law?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1633, 1657-58 (1999); Timothy Teter, Note, Merger and the 
Machines:  An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1061 (1993) (arguing that the value of computer programs depends on interoperability); see also 
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, (working 
paper 2001) (suggesting that reverse engineering should be legal when it promotes interoperability, but not 
when it permits free riding); Cohen & Lemley, supra note __, at 17-21 (expressing concern that patent law 
may not protect reverse engineering). 
 For a contrary view, see generally Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae:  
Technophobia, Law and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 903 (1994) (contending that 
there should be no right to reverse engineer software), and Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works:  Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 977 (1993) (same).  
 
144   Hewlett and Packard and Jobs and Wozniack are the classic examples, but the story has taken on a life 
of its own.  See, e.g., Micalyn S. Harris, UCITA: Helping David Face Goliath, 18 J. Marshall J. Comp. & 
Info. L. 365, 375 (1999). 
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it is in other industries.  Software patents are important, but the relatively low fixed costs 
associated with software development, coupled with other forms of overlapping 
intellectual property protection for software,145 mean that innovation in software does not 
depend critically on strong, broad protection.  Second, the rapid, incremental innovation 
crucial to the software industry may be stifled or at least regulated by older companies 
that own software patents based on prior generations of products.  Cohen and Lemley 
offer several reasons to believe that the doctrine of equivalents may be applied too 
broadly in the software industry, allowing owners of old software patents to prevent the 
development of new generations of technology.146  Finally, a culture of rapid-fire 
incremental improvements leads to a large number of low-level innovations.  Copyright 
is not capable of providing effective protection for such innovations because it does not 
protect functionality.147  Some form of protection for such innovations is desirable.  In the 
                                                           
145   Predominantly copyright, but also trade secret and contract law.  One factor militating in favor of 
stronger intellectual property protection in software is the ease of duplication of digital information in the 
networked world.  But copyright protection is much better suited than patent to preventing exact 
duplication.  Copyright law has also been modified to better prevent such copying in the computer context 
by allowing copyright owners to control access to copy-protected works.  See 17 U.S.C. §1201 (the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act). 
 
146   Cohen & Lemley, supra note __, at 39-50 (incremental nature of software innovation, lack of good 
prior art, rapid pace of change, and the difficulty of characterizing code inventions in words all contribute 
to broad readings of software inventions).  They write: 
The pattern of cumulative, sequential innovation and reuse that prevails in the software industry 
creates the risk that software patents will cast large shadows in infringement litigation. 
Specifically, we believe that because innovation is especially likely to proceed by building on 
existing code in other programs, the temptation for the trier of fact to find equivalence of 
improvements will be correspondingly greater. 
Id. at 41. 
 
147   For a detailed discussion, see Samuelson et al., supra note __, at 2350-56; Pamela Samuelson, CONTU 
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 
1984 Duke L.J. 663. 
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absence of other forms of protection, a large number of narrow software patents may be 
the best way of protecting these low-level innovations.148     
 Patent protection for such incremental software inventions should be relatively 
narrow, and in particular should not generally extend across several product 
generations.149  But broad software patents are precisely what the court's PHOSITA 
approach has produced.  By defining software inventions in broad terms, supported by 
very little in the way of detailed disclosure, the Federal Circuit has encouraged software 
patents to be drafted broadly and to be applied to accused devices that are far removed 
from the original patented invention.  By implication, the Federal Circuit's standard also 
seems to suggest that many software patents on low-level incremental improvements will 
be invalid for obviousness.  In software, then, the Federal Circuits standard seems to 
have it backwards. 
 
 2. Optimal Biotechnology Patent Policy 
If any technology fits the criteria of high cost and high risk innovation, it is 
certainly biotechnology.  Biotechnology products appear in a wide variety of economic 
sectors, from pharmaceuticals to foodstuffs to industrial processes.150  Development of 
biotechnology products, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector, has been characterized 
                                                           
148   The Manifesto worries that software patents may be too broad given the incremental nature of software 
innovation.  Samuelson et al., supra note __, at 2345-46.  See also Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: 
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 
Emory L.J. 1025 (1990).  As noted below, we share this concern, but believe the solution is to narrow the 
scope of those patents. 
 
149   See generally Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology, 
94 Colum. L. Rev. 2674 (1994). 
 
150   See Dan L. Burk, A Biotechnology Primer, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 611 (1994). 
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by extremely long development times and high development costs.  Such delays are due 
in part due to the stringent regulatory oversight exercised over the safety of new drugs, 
foods, biologics, and over environmental release of new organisms.151  Yet the onerous 
regulatory requirements to which biotechnology is subject may obscure a more 
fundamental uncertainty that justifies such oversight: biotechnology products arise out of 
living systems, and are typically intended to interact with other human or non-human 
living systems.  Such interactions, whether physiological or ecological, are enormously 
complex and the systems involved poorly characterized.  As a consequence, the 
functionality of biotechnology products is always unforeseeable, and always involves a 
high degree of uncertainty and risk.152 
 Consistent with these characteristics, the current Federal Circuit jurisprudence 
lowers the obviousness barrier for biotechnology.  Much of the criticism that has been 
directed against the biotechnology cases described above has focused on the availability 
of research tools that have made routine the isolation and characterization of biological 
macromolecules.153  Given such tools, the outcome of a search for a particular nucleotide 
or protein seems relatively certain, and hence it is argued, obvious.  But to the extent that 
                                                           
151   PharmA estimates that the total time spent from the beginning of a research project to the marketing of 
a successful drug is 14.2 years, 1.8 years of which is due to the FDA approval process.  See 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profile01/chapter2.pdf.  Estimates of the average cost of 
drug development and testing range from $110 million to $500 million; the latter is the industrys figure.  
Compare id. with http://www.citizen.org/Press/pr-drugs33.htm. 
 
152 For example, the Centocor sepsis antibody, a highly promising biotechnology treatment, succeeded in 
passing many years of costly trials,but failed in the last phase of FDA approval. 
 
153 Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons:  Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network 
Model of Innovation, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 987 (2000); Philippe Ducor, New Drug Discovery 
Technologies and Patents, 22 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L.J. 369 (1996); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 827 (1999).  See generally 
John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in 
the American System, 50 Emory L.J. 101 (2001). 
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patents spur innovation, rather than invention, a relatively low threshold for patentability 
is still needed for biotechnology.154  The availability or unavailability of a patent is 
expected to have little effect on the incentive to engage in preliminary research155  that 
is, in the case of biotechnology, to use the available tools to secure a macromolecule of 
interest.  But the ready availability of tools for finding a new biotechnology product do 
not change the high cost and uncertainty entailed in developing a marketable product 
using that macromolecule; hence a lowered standard of obviousness still makes sense 
from a policy standpoint.156 
Yet what the Federal Circuit gives biotechnology with one hand, it takes away 
with the other.  Although biotechnology patents are relatively easy to obtain under the 
obviousness standard, the accompanying enablement and written description standards 
dramatically narrow the scope of the resulting patents.  By requiring disclosure of the 
particular structure or sequence in order to claim biological macromolecules, the Federal 
Circuit effectively limits the scope of a patent on those molecules to the structure or 
sequence disclosed.  This standard concomitantly dictates that the inventor have the 
molecule in hand (so to speak) before being able to claim it  in other words, after a 
substantial investment has already been made in isolating and characterizing the 
molecule.  The result is that everyone who invests in discovering a new molecule will 
                                                           
154   See Merges, Uncertainty, supra note __; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2187, 2225-27 (2000); Karen I. Boyd, 
Nonobviousness and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 
12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 311 (1997). 
 
155   See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy 519 (2d ed. 1997). 
 
156   One way to think of this is to reconceive patents as a financing mechanism: by providing definable 
rights, patents enable companies to obtain the funding they need to turn an invention into a product.  See 
Golden, supra note __, at 167-172; Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 
J. Sm. & Emerging Bus. L. 137 (2000). 
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receive a patent, but one that is trivial to evade.  Under this standard, no one is likely to 
receive a patent broad enough to support the further costs of development.157 
An additional drawback to the proliferation of narrow biotechnology patents may 
be the development of what has been termed an anti-commons in the biotechnology 
industry.158  The anticommons is characterized by fragmented property rights, the 
aggregation of which is necessary to make effective use of the property.159  Aggregating 
such fragmented property rights entails high search and negotiation costs to locate and 
bargain with the many rights owners whose collective permissions are necessary to 
complete broader development.  This type of licensing environment may quickly become 
dominated by hold outs who refuse to license their essential sliver of the pie unless 
bribed.160 Because a given project will fail without their cooperation, hold-outs may be 
prompted to demand a bribe close to the value of the entire project.161  And, of course, 
                                                           
157   See Kenneth G. Chahine, Enabling DNA and Protein Composition Claims: Why Claiming Biological 
Equivalents Encourages Innovation, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 333 (1997) (arguing for a broader scope of 
biotechnology patents, extending to proteins with comparable biological activity). 
 Curiously, Merges doesnt see this as a major problem, suggesting that in general the Federal 
Circuit has overall been quite successful at integrating biotechnology cases into the fabric of patent law.  
Merges, Solicitude, supra note __, at 2228.  We think the written description cases and the correspondingly 
narrow scope afforded biotechnology patents are a more serious problem than Merges acknowledges. 
 
158 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998) (patenting genetic research can lead to an "anticommons" 
in which multiple, conflicting property rights impede efficient use of the patents). see also Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 621 (1998); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting 
Controversy, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 633 (1994).  But see John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 Sci. 689 
(1998) (noting that similar concerns have been raised with other technologies, such as polymers). 
 On the antitrust issues raised by patents on research tools, see John H. Barton, Patents and 
Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 449 
(1997).  For discussion of a related anticommons problem, reach-through royalty agreements, see James 
Gregory Cullem, Panning for Biotechnology Gold: Reach-Through Royalty Damage Awards for Infringing 
Uses of Patented Molecular Sieves, 39 Idea 553 (1999). 
 
159   Heller, supra note __, at 670-72. 
 
160   On the holdout problem, see generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1961). 
 
161   Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351 (1991). 
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every property holder needed for the project is subject to this same incentive; if everyone 
holds out, the cost of the project will rise substantially, and probably will rise 
prohibitively 
Unfortunately, if patent law is to accommodate the uncertainty of biotechnology 
innovation, this proliferation of narrow biotechnology patents may be nearly impossible 
to avoid under the reciprocal structure of obviousness and enablement in the PHOSITA 
patent doctrine.162  In order for the invention to avoid obviousness, it must be deemed 
beyond the skill of the PHOSITA to construct given the level of disclosure in the prior 
art.  Yet this means that in disclosing the invention, the inventor must tell those of 
ordinary skill a good deal more about how to make and use it, effectively raising the 
standard for enablement and written description.  The Federal Circuits insistence that the 
results biotechnology research are unforeseeable or unpredictable avoids the problem of 
obviousness, but this inevitably results in an extremely stringent standard for disclosure 
and description. 
 
 B. Can Patent Law Produce Optimal Patent Policy? 
 If we are right that patent law doctrines lead to troubling policy results in both 
software and biotechnology, what is to be done?  In particular, the question is whether the 
law should adapt to our policy prescriptions, and if so how.  In this section, we consider 
several possible ways of modify patent law to accommodate the dictates of patent policy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
162   See, e.g., Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard 
After Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 Ind. L. Rev. 537, 557-58 (1999) (noting 
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 1. Industry-Specific Patent Legislation 
 One obvious response to the different policy prescriptions described above is to 
explicitly legislate different patent standards for different industries.  While patent law 
has historically been uniform, with a single set of legal standards designed to cover 
"everything under the sun made by man,"163 Congress has shown increased interest in 
tailoring patent law to the needs of particular industries.  In the last twenty years, it has 
lengthened the patent term for most pharmaceutical patents,164 protected certain 
experimental uses of pharmaceuticals by generic suppliers from liability,165 prohibited 
enforcing patents on medical procedures against doctors,166 relaxed the obviousness 
standard for biotechnological processes,167 and created a new defense against business 
method patents.168 It has supplemented patent protection for semiconductors with a sui 
generis statute.169  It has even passed a "private" patent bill lengthening the term of one 
narrow group of patents.170  In each case, Congress reacted to particular complaints about 
the perceived unfairness of applying a general legal standard to a particular industry.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the linkage between the Federal Circuits view of biotechnology as an uncertain art and the narrowness of 
the patents that result). 
 
163   Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).  See also TRIPs art. 27(1) (requiring that patents 
be available without discrimination as to the form of technology). 
 
164   See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156. 
 
165   35 U.S.C. § 271(e). 
 
166   See 35 U.S.C. § 287. 
 
167   35 U.S.C. § 103(b). 
 
168   35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(3). 
 
169   Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. 
 
170   See 35 U.S.C. § 155A.  On the history of private patent legislation, see Robert P. Merges & Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 Harv. J. Legis. 45 (2000). 
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Still other bills currently pending in Congress would change the patent law standards for 
business method patents or extend the patent for Claritin.171 
 A number of scholars have suggested that patent law needs to be modified to take 
account of the particular needs of the software industry.  Some suggest that software 
patents are inappropriate altogether,172 others that Internet business method patents are.173  
Others suggest that a form of sui generis patent-like protection is appropriate.174  Still 
others who endorse the general framework argue that the courts should apply patent law 
to software in somewhat different ways than they do in other industries.175  Similarly, 
scholars have suggested that biotechnology patent standards should deviate from the 
general patent law rules.176  Some argue that certain types of biotechnological patents 
should be unpatentable altogether.177  Others suggest that the disclosure requirements 
                                                           
171   Cite Boucher-Berman; Claritin patent relief. 
 
172   See, e.g., Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note __. 
 
173   See, e.g., Matthew G. Wells, Internet Business Method Patent Policy, 87 Va. L. Rev. 729, 770-72 
(2001). 
 
174   See, e.g., Samuelson et al, supra note __; Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer 
Software, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1329 (1987).  For a more recent and somewhat different proposal, see Lester 
Thurow, Needed:  A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, Harv. Bus. Rev. 95, 95 (Sept.-Oct. 1995) 
(discussing software and biotechnology industries).   
 
175   Most commonly, people suggest that the rapid market cycles in software justify shorter terms of 
protection for software patents.  Cites.  Cf. Cohen & Lemley, supra note __, (suggesting ways to avoid 
overbroad application of the doctrine of equivalents and protect reverse engineering); Stern, supra note __; 
Cohen, supra note __ (both suggesting application of an innovative programmer standard to software 
patents). 
 
176   For a critical analysis of such proposals, see Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting 
Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L.J. 1 (1991).  As noted above, the rules 
in biotechnology cases already do diverge from the general rules in the context of obviousness standards 
for biotechnological processes.  See supra note __. 
 
177   See, e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights Revisited, 32 
McGeorge L. Rev. 111 (2000); Mark O. Hatfield, From Microbe to Man, 1 Animal L. 5 (1995) (both 
making moral arguments against patenting life).  For a very different argument against the patenting of 
cDNA sequences, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of 
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should be loosened,178 that the obviousness standard should be lowered,179 or that the 
scope of DNA sequence patents should be restricted.180  They have variously argued that 
the Federal Circuit should defer to the PTO,181 or conversely that the PTO should defer to 
the Federal Circuit.182 
 Calls to modify patent law are a natural response to the different effects patent 
law has in different industries.  The economic effects of patents are quite different in 
different industries.  Thus, in a perfect world the patent system might well be tailored to 
give optimal incentives to each different industry.   
 We do not live in a perfect world, however.  In the real world, a number of factors 
caution against tailoring the patent law to the needs of particular industries.  The most 
obvious barrier is legal  the TRIPs agreement prohibits member states from 
discriminating in the grant of patents based on the type of technology at issue.183  As 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Certain Inventions Associated With the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1 
(1995). 
 
178   See, e.g., Hodges, supra note __; Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written 
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 615 (1998); Harris A. 
Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 78 J. Pat. & Trademark Ofc. Socy 209 
(1998); Margaret Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 
35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1233 (2000); Cliff D. Weston, 
Chilling of the Corn: Agricultural Biotechnology in the Face of U.S. Patent Law and the Cartagena 
Protocol, 4 J. Sm. & Emerging Bus. L. 377, 389-92 (2000). 
 For a related argument, that the biotech written description cases are really about enablement and 
serve to obscure the real purposes of the written description requirement, see Mark D. Janis, On Courts 
Herding Cats: Contending With the Written Description Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent 
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 Wash. U. J. L. & Poly 55 (2000). 
 
179   See Boyd, supra note __, at 311. 
 
180   See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note __; Eisenberg & Merges, supra note __. 
 
181   See Rai, supra note __, at 842-47. 
 
182   See Craig R. Miles, Goldilocks Patent Protection for DNA Inventions: Not Too Thick, Not Too Thin, 
But Just Right, 2 Modern Trends in Intell. Prop. 3 (1998). 
 
183   GATT TRIPs, art. 27(1). 
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noted above, however, the United States has not faithfully followed this treaty mandate.  
Neither has the EU, which has industry-specific rules for compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceuticals and for the patentability of software and business methods.184 
Even if industry-specific patent legislation were legal, we are not fully persuaded 
that it is a good idea.  First, while economics can make useful policy suggestions as to 
how patents work in different industries, we are skeptical of its ability to dictate in detail 
the right patent rules for each industry.185  Economic theory is more useful in making 
general suggestions about how the patent system can be adapted than it is as the basis for 
a whole series of new statutes. 
 Second, rewriting the patent law for each industry would involve substantial 
administrative costs and uncertainties.  Congress would have to write new statutes not 
just for biotechnology and software, but for any number of different industries with 
special characteristics: semiconductors, chemistry, Internet, perhaps telecommunications 
and other industries would need separate statutes.  District court judges, who already 
have enough trouble learning the arcane rules of patent law in the relatively few patent 
cases they hear, would have to learn a host of new statutes.  The law supporting these 
statutes would be slow to develop, since fewer cases would come up involving each 
statute.  The resulting uncertainty would perhaps enrich lawyers, but it surely would not 
be conducive to encouraging innovation.  There will also be a great deal of line-drawing 
to be done, as the boundaries between industries are not clear-cut and are notoriously 
mutable.  Semiconductor manufacturers patent and use software all the time.  Drug 
                                                           
184   cites 
 
185   See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813 (1984) 
(rejecting as impractical an effort to determine optimal patent length for each industry). 
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delivery systems might be thought of as medical devices, pharmaceuticals, or 
biotechnology; presumably a different law would apply depending on how the invention 
was characterized.  Even technologies that seem radically different, like biotechnology 
and software, may unexpectedly converge, as recent developments in bioinformatics and 
proteomics have made clear.186  Further, a significant percentage of inventions fall into 
more than one field.187  And of course new fields arise regularly; imagine trying to fit all 
modern inventions into categories created 50 or 100 years ago.  As a result, it will prove 
impossible to carve up innovation into static fields.     
 This point raises a related one.  The history of industry-specific statutes suggests 
that many turn out to be failures because they are drafted with current technology in 
mind, and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the inevitable change in 
technology.  The best example is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.188  Passed after 
six years of debate, the SCPA created a detailed set of rules designed to protect 
semiconductor mask works.  But it has virtually never been used.189  The most likely 
reason is that the particular focus of the SCPA -- duplication of mask works -- is obsolete 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
186   Bioinformatics involves the regularized use of computer models to identify and predict gene structures.  
See, e.g., Ken Howard, The Bioinformatics Gold Rush, Sci. Am., July 2000, at 58.  Proteomics involves the 
use of computer chips to build and test proteins.  See, e.g., Carol Ezzell, Beyond the Human Genome, Sci. 
Am., July 2000, at 64, 67-69 (describing proteomics). 
 
187   See Allison & Lemley, Whos Patenting What, supra note __, at 2114 n.45 (on average, patents in the 
late 1990s fell into 1.49 different technology areas).  This is actually a modest increase from the 1970s, 
when the number was 1.37.  Most of this increase is due to the growth of software and biotechnology 
patents.  See Allison & Lemley, Complexity, supra note __, at [draft at 20 Table 1]. 
 
188   17 U.S.C. §§901 et seq. 
 
189   There is only one reported case interpreting the SCPA.  Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 
977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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because of changes in the way semiconductor chips are made.  Industry-specific patent 
statutes risk a similar fate.190 
 Finally, and of most concern, technology-specific patent legislation will 
encourage rent seeking.  Patent law has some balance today in part because different 
industries have different interests, making it difficult for one interest group to push 
through changes to the statute.  Industry-specific legislation is much more vulnerable to 
industry capture.  It is no accident that the industry-specific portions of the patent law are 
among the most complex and confusing sections,191 and that they have had some 
pernicious consequences.192  The copyright model -- in which industry-specific rules and 
exceptions have led to a bloated, impenetrable statute that reads like the tax code193 -- is 
hardly one patent law should emulate.194  
 
 2. General Modifications to Accommodate Policy Concerns 
 An alternative to industry-specific patent legislation is some sort of general 
change to the patent law that permits the courts to reach more efficient results in 
                                                           
190   Cf. 35 U.S.C. §103(b), which is irrelevant today largely because general patent standards today reach 
the same result.  See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 
191   In particular, sections 103(b) (biotechnological proceses), 155A (private patent relief), 156 (Hatch-
Waxman pharmaceutical patent term extension), and 287 (medical process patents). 
 
192   The Hatch-Waxman provisions in particular have been used on numerous occasions to violate the 
antitrust laws.  Pharmaceutical patent owners have colluded with putative generic entrants to prevent that 
company or any other from entering the market.  See, e.g., Andrx Pharmaceuticals v. Biovail Corp., __ F.3d 
__, 2001 WL 855472 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2001); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 
682 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 
193   See generally 17 U.S.C.  On the unnecessary complexity of the copyright laws, see Jessica Litman, 
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19 (1996); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive 
Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 29 (1994). 
 
194   Indeed, scholars have suggested the opposite -- that copyright law should learn from patent.  See Mark 
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 (1997); John 
Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119 (1991). 
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particular industries.  General changes are more promising than industry-specific 
legislation for the reasons we suggest above.195  In this section, we consider two possible 
changes to the patent law that might solve the biotechnology-software problem we 
identify in this article. 
 
a. Decoupling the PHOSITA 
First, courts might decouple the PHOSITA standards for obviousness and 
enablement, thus allowing the two requirements for patentability to be independently 
adapted to the incentive requirements of various technologies.  The seeds of such an 
approach may already be latent in established legal doctrines of obviousness and 
enablement.  Recall that the characteristics of the obviousness PHOSITA and those of the 
enablement PHOSITA are not entirely coterminous; they are measured at different times.  
Because the level of knowledge for the enablement PHOSITA is measured at the time a 
patent is filed, rather than as of the date of invention, a larger pool of prior art will 
frequently be imputed to the knowledge of the enablement PHOSITA.  The accumulation 
of prior art between invention and filing could in theory allow an invention to enjoy both 
a low threshold of obviousness and a low threshold of disclosure. 
It may be that this differential knowledge should be emphasized, in order to 
decouple the tight reciprocity of obviousness and enablement.  In the case of 
biotechnology, this approach might bring policy expectations into line with doctrinal 
results.  The characteristics of the industry would seem to demand fewer and broader 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
195   Of course, general modifications may have disproportionate impact on specific industries.  Thus, if 
Wells is right that Internet business methods have low costs of development and are easy to bring to 
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patents that are easier to obtain, which is to say, patents with a relatively low obviousness 
threshold, but also a relatively low enablement threshold.  These might be provided by 
the temporal disparity in the two PHOSITAs.  Since the body of prior art grows during 
the period between invention and the filing of a patent, the corpus of knowledge imputed 
to the enablement PHOSITA will be larger than that imputed to the obviousness 
PHOSITA.  Thus, the level of disclosure required to enable one of ordinary skill at the 
time of filing could well be lower than that required to enable one of ordinary skill at the 
time the invention was made, because the enablement PHOSITA is expected to know 
more.  Conversely, an invention may well be non-obvious at the time it is made, although 
it would not be at the time a patent is filed.  This will depend to some extent upon when 
the invention is considered to be made for non-obviousness purposes.  If the inventor 
must rely upon her filing date as the date the invention is made, then the knowledge 
imputed to the enablement and obviousness PHOSITAs may be coterminous; however, if 
the date of invention can be related back to an early time of conception, the disparity 
between the two bodies of prior art may be substantial. 
This same effect may hold true for the PHOSITA of the written description 
requirement, albeit to a lesser extent.  The written description requirement substantially 
overlaps with the degree of disclosure required for enablement, but is likely to require  
something more.  Because the unique purpose of the written description requirement is to 
demonstrate what the inventor had in his possession at the time the patent was filed, 
courts have been understandably reluctant to assume that details missing from the 
disclosure could be supplied by the prior art knowledge imputed to the PHOSITA.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
market, see Wells, supra note __, at 770-72, they are more likely to be found obvious under the standard 
we propose. 
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the inventor is less able to rely upon the level of knowledge in the prior art to establish a 
less stringent requirement for written description.  Nonetheless, some courts have 
suggested that there is some flexibility in the written description requirement, although 
that has not been the trend in the Federal Circuit biotechnology cases.  If the less 
stringent holdings of those older, cases could be revitalized, the outcome for 
biotechnology might be brought into line with the policy expectations for that 
technology. 
However, this consonance between policy outcomes and the emphasis on 
disparities in prior art may be peculiar to biotechnology, and not capable of 
generalization to other technologies.  In particular, reliance upon the differential in prior 
art between obviousness and enablement may not yield the optimal result in the case of 
computer software.  As we have described, the profile of that industry militates in favor 
of narrower and more sharply defined patents; or in other words, toward a higher 
threshold of patentability for both obviousness and disclosure.  But, in this case, the 
differential in prior art between the time of invention and the time of filing pushes in the 
wrong direction, away from a stringent enablement standard.  No matter how high the 
threshold for obviousness may be set, the passage of time between invention and filing 
will place more knowledge at the disposal of the PHOSITA at the latter event, favoring 
less disclosure rather than more. This means that even a decoupled PHOSITA standard 
wont achieve ideal results in both biotechnology  where the standards may need to be 
relaxed somewhat  and software  where they need to be tightened. 
Consequently, it may be inadequate to rely upon the knowledge differential 
already found in the PHOSITA standard in order to correct the mismatch of policy 
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outcomes and doctrinal analysis.  What may be requited is to decouple the section 103 
and section 112 PHOSITA standards altogether, recognizing that the PHOSITA 
contemplated for purposes of obviousness is simply not the PHOSITA contemplated for 
purposes of disclosure.  Although tight reciprocity of the two standards, mediated by a 
common PHOSITA construct, makes for an appealing and intellectually elegant doctrinal 
framework, theoretical esthetics might be required to give way to technological 
pragmatics.  Again, there are precursors latent in the case law that could be developed 
into such a doctrinal shift; recall that the section 103 PHOSITA has been portrayed by 
some courts as a bit of an innovator, while the section 112 PHOSITA has not.  Certainly 
the two constructs are conceived as being engaged in very different inquiries, the first 
seeking some motivation to compile prior art knowledge into an invention, and the 
second drawing upon prior art knowledge to supplement an invention disclosure.  
Divorcing the two inquiries could allow each standard the freedom to independently 
accommodate the incentive needed by a given industry. 
   
  b. Considering Innovation, Not Just Invention 
 Second, courts or Congress might modify the standard of obviousness to account 
for the cost and uncertainty of production and development, not just invention.  We think 
that the divergence between legal and policy outcomes is attributable to the fact that 
software inventions are much easier to bring to market than biotechnology inventions.  
The court repeatedly intones the maxim that biotechnology is an "uncertain art."196  We 
                                                           
196   See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (biotechnology less predictable than 
mechanics or electronics). 
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think, however, that it is not so much invention as product development, production and 
regulatory approval that is uncertain in biotechnology.   
 From a policy perspective, the result is the same: biotechnological inventions 
need more incentive than other types of inventions if they are actually to make it to 
market.  This suggests that the lowered obviousness standard found in the Federal 
Circuits biotechnology decisions is the correct outcome, but that the court has reached 
the correct result for the wrong reasons.  The justification in biotechnology for a lower 
standard of obviousness is not, as the Federal Circuit has suggested, the cost or difficulty 
of invention  numerous commentators have rightly pointed out that the costs of isolating 
valuable macromolecules are now trivial, and the expectation of success in such an 
undertaking is high.  The justification in biotechnology for a lower obviousness standard 
is rather that the costs of bringing such products to market are prohibitive.  Product 
development can be encouraged by offering patentees a greater certainty of obtaining the 
financial rewards from an exclusive patent right.   
A number of commentators have suggested that the court should take account of 
the higher costs and greater uncertainty of innovation in biotechnology by modifying the 
nonobviousness standard to account for what might be called economic 
nonobviousness.197  Karen Boyd argues that permitting evidence of economic 
nonobviousness would improve biotechnology policy, and that the court could start with 
a rough assumption that all biotechnological inventions are high-cost inventions for 
which a finding of economic nonobviousness would be appropriate.198  Rob Merges 
                                                           
197   Boyd, supra note __, at 311. 
 
198   See id. at 337-339. 
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makes the more general argument that the courts should reduce the obviousness standard 
either in cases in which the invention itself is uncertain, or in which the 
commercialization process is long and costly.199 
We think Merges and Boyd are on the right track in pointing to the cost and 
uncertainty of innovation as a whole  not just invention  as relevant factors in the 
nonobviousness determination.200  But we also think that courts in the biotechnology 
obviousness cases have effectively done this already, implicitly accommodating the cost 
of development in cases like Bell and Deuel.201  Nonetheless, there are at least three 
important reasons to consider innovation cost expressly, rather than by modifying 
existing law sub silentio.  First, it is rarely wise for courts to conceal the reasons for their 
decisions.  The integrity of the patent law can only be enhanced by a forthright discussion 
of the values served by the decisions in Bell and Deuel. 
Second, considering innovation cost expressly makes it clear that the level of skill 
in the art is not what is driving decisions like Bell and Deuel.  As a result, the Federal 
Circuit should not feel constrained to decide section 112 cases in accordance with the 
distorted view of biotechnology presented in those cases.  In particular, the courts 
syllogism in Eli Lilly  if nonobvious, then not sufficiently described202  could safely be 
rejected if the reason for nonobviousness were not related to the level of skill in the art. 
                                                           
199   Merges, Uncertainty, supra note __, at 34-36 (technical uncertainty), 48-49 (cost of development). 
 
200   Cf. A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 Am. 
U. L. Rev. 1097, 1116 (1989) (arguing that cost should drive the nonobviousness calculation). 
 
201   Accord Boyd, supra note __, at 342 (By any honest interpretation of the nonobviousness statute, the 
decisions in Deuel and Bell are wrong; nonetheless endorsing the results for policy reasons). 
 
202   See Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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Finally, explicit consideration of development cost and uncertainty can work both 
ways.  Commentators have generally focused on economic nonobviousness as a reason to 
enhance protection in industries like biotechnology.203  While most biotechnological 
inventions would benefit from such consideration because of their high cost and uncertain 
development process, in the case of software development the opposite is true.  Software 
inventions tend to have a quick, cheap, and fairly straightforward post-invention 
development cycle.  Most of the work in software development occurs in the initial 
coding, not in development or production.  The lead time to market in the software 
industry tends to be short.  The capital investment requirement for software development 
is relatively low -- mostly hiring personnel, not building laboratories or manufacturing 
infrastructure.  Debugging and test-marketing is tedious and occasionally time-
consuming, but does not rival the cost of stringent safety testing and agency oversight 
necessary in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.  As a result, we believe the 
application of economic principles of nonobviousness should raise the obviousness bar in 
the software industry, just as it is lowered in the biotechnology industry.  More generally, 
economic nonobviousness is a principle that must be applied across the board, not just to 
benefit patentees in a particular industry. 
Judicial consideration of the costs and uncertainty of the product development 
process is feasible.  Courts already consider a variety of secondary considerations of 
nonobviousness, despite the absence of any statutory authority for doing so.  While the 
Court in Graham v. John Deere decided merely that secondary considerations may have 
                                                           
203   See Merges, Uncertainty, supra note __; Boyd, supra note __. 
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relevancy,204 the Federal Circuit regularly speaks of them as a required part of any 
obviousness inquiry.205  And the secondary considerations that have been used tend to be 
economic indicia of a patents value: the commercial success of a patent, long-felt need 
for the invention and the failure of others to produced it, market response to the invention 
by copying or acquiescence, and simultaneous invention.206  One may reasonably 
question the economic value of some of this evidence,207 but it is clear that the courts are 
already willing to consider economic indicia of nonobviousness of their own volition in a 
variety of patent cases.  As a result, introducing evidence of development cost and 
uncertainty will not substantially disrupt the existing processes for determining patent 
validity.   
A case-specific focus on development cost as a plus-factor also avoids many of 
the problems with industry-specific patent legislation discussed above.208  Because courts 
could easily adopt this test themselves, no legislation is necessary.  This not only avoids 
administrative costs, but it also avoids the very real problem of industry rent-seeking.  
Further, because it is a general policy, it can be applied to all types of patent cases.  
While the results will be tailored to the characteristics of particular industries, the legal 
rules will not be.  Indeed, by creating a framework in which courts can take account of 
                                                           
204   383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
 
205   See, e.g., Greenwood v. Haitori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 
206   See id. considering the first four factors listed; cf. Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 
1367, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (simultaneous invention may be a relevant factor, but wasnt in that case).   
 
207   See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Economic Perspectives on Innovation: Patent Standards and Commercial 
Success, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803 (1988); Edmund Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for 
Patents, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989) (all criticizing reliance on commercial success). 
 
208   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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legitimate policy concerns, the Federal Circuit may actually be able to reduce the judicial 
drift towards industry-specific legal rules that we observed in Part I. 
 
Conclusion 
Patent law is becoming technology-specific.  The legal rules applied to 
biotechnology cases bear less and less resemblance to those applied in software cases.  
While there are good policy reasons to treat the two industries differently, the current 
legal rules are not expressly informed by the economics of the industries, but by an ad 
hoc combination of judicial policymaking and stare decisis.  Not surprisingly, they dont 
reflect optimal patent policy in either biotechnology or software.  We have offered some 
explanations for this phenomenon, along with two specific suggestions  decoupling the 
obviousness and enablement standards and adding development cost to the secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness.  These suggestions will help optimize patent policy in 
general and biotechnology and software law in particular. 
 
